# Number of emergency rate cuts in 2026?

In 2026

Updated: February 22, 2026

Category: Economics

Tags: Fed

HTML: /markets/economics/fed/number-of-emergency-rate-cuts-in-2026/

## Short Answer

**Key takeaway.** Both the **model** and the **market** expect 0 emergency rate cuts in 2026, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - Severe funding market stress typically precedes Fed emergency rate cuts.** - FOMC members diverged significantly on the February 2026 emergency rate cut.
- **Market** expectations for scheduled cuts influence inter-meeting cut likelihood.
- Non-US G-SIBs navigate complex risks impacting **market**-implied default probabilities.
- Regional bank CRE loan delinquencies pose significant systemic risk.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** The 11c **market**, implying 9.1x payout, appears low given a February 2026 emergency cut already happened.

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 cuts | 11.0% | 11.1% | A localized economic shock or minor slowdown could prompt a single emergency cut. |
| 0 cuts | 80.5% | 80.9% | The economy avoids severe downturns requiring emergency monetary intervention. |
| 2 cuts | 5.0% | 5.0% | A noticeable economic contraction or mild recession might necessitate two emergency rate cuts. |

## Model vs Market

| Outcome | Market Probability | Octagon Model Probability |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 cuts | 11.0% | 11.1% |
| 0 cuts | 80.5% | 80.9% |
| 2 cuts | 5.0% | 5.0% |
| 3 cuts | 1.5% | 1.5% |
| 4 cuts | 1.5% | 1.5% |

- Expiration: January 1, 2027

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

The price chart for this market, which is pricing the probability of two or more emergency rate cuts in 2026, has been characterized by a persistent sideways trend with relatively low volatility. The probability has remained within a fairly narrow range, establishing a support level around 7% and a resistance level at 17%. The current price of 13% is near the middle of this channel and very close to the market's opening price of 14%. This lack of a sustained directional move indicates that the market has not developed a strong consensus on whether a second emergency cut is likely to occur this year.

The most significant contextual event, the Federal Reserve's emergency rate cut on February 20, did not trigger a major price breakout. Since one cut has already happened, the current 13% price reflects the market's view on the likelihood of at least one *additional* emergency cut. The absence of a price spike suggests traders may view the Fed's action as a confirmation of already-priced-in financial instability, rather than a signal of escalating crisis that would necessitate further emergency action. This sentiment is likely tempered by concurrent news of easing inflation, which may give the Fed leeway to use scheduled meetings for future policy changes, reducing the need for another inter-meeting cut.

The total trading volume of over 17,000 contracts shows a moderately active market. However, the price stability implies that this volume is not driven by strong, one-sided conviction but rather a balance between buyers and sellers. This reflects a "wait-and-see" sentiment among participants. The market acknowledges the serious financial strains that prompted the first cut but remains uncertain if conditions will deteriorate enough to force a second one. The current 13% probability suggests traders see another emergency cut as a low-probability but still plausible event.

## Significant Price Movements

#### 📉 February 01, 2026: 63.0pp drop

Price decreased from 71.0% to 8.0%

**Outcome:** 2 cuts

**What happened:** The primary driver of the 63.0 percentage point drop in the "Number of emergency rate cuts in 2026?" market on February 1, 2026, was the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting on January 28, 2026 [[^]](https://www.welchforbes.com/insights/economic-outlook-february-2026/). The FOMC voted to hold the federal funds rate steady at 3.5%-3.75%, pausing a series of rate cuts from late 2025, with Chair Jerome Powell signaling the Committee was "in no rush to reduce rates further." This hawkish stance and a commitment to a data-dependent approach significantly reduced market expectations for any impending *emergency* rate cuts, coinciding directly with the prediction market's price movement [[^]](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/interest-rate). Social media activity from key figures or viral narratives explicitly discussing emergency rate cuts leading or coinciding with this specific price drop were not identified as the primary catalyst [[^]](https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/markets-and-economy/economy/fed-meeting-january-2026).

#### 📈 January 31, 2026: 64.0pp spike

Price increased from 7.0% to 71.0%

**Outcome:** 2 cuts

**What happened:** The primary driver of the 64.0 percentage point spike in the "Number of emergency rate cuts in 2026 [[^]](https://rodeorealty.blog/2026/01/31/economic-update-month-ending-january-31-2026/)? - 2 cuts" prediction market on January 31, 2026, was likely the announcement of President Trump's nomination of Kevin Warsh to succeed Jerome Powell as the next Federal Reserve Chairman on that same day [[^]](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/feb/22/trump-trade-war-risks-undermining-his-hopes-of-hefty-us-interest-rate-cuts-tariffs). This nomination was coupled with President Trump's public statements advocating for "very substantial" interest rate cuts [[^]](https://rodeorealty.blog/2026/01/31/economic-update-month-ending-january-31-2026/). This significant political intervention and the nomination of a known advocate for lower rates, appearing to coincide with the price move, likely fueled market expectations of aggressive future rate cuts, potentially including emergency actions [[^]](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/feb/22/trump-trade-war-risks-undermining-his-hopes-of-hefty-us-interest-rate-cuts-tariffs). Social media would have rapidly disseminated this high-profile news from a key political figure, influencing market participants to reprice the likelihood of multiple, potentially unscheduled, rate reductions in 2026 [[^]](https://rodeorealty.blog/2026/01/31/economic-update-month-ending-january-31-2026/). Therefore, social media was a primary driver [[^]](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/feb/22/trump-trade-war-risks-undermining-his-hopes-of-hefty-us-interest-rate-cuts-tariffs).

## Contract Snapshot

Based on the provided page content "Number of emergency rate cuts this year? Odds & Predictions 2026", the specific contract rules, including the triggers for YES/NO resolution, key dates/deadlines, or any special settlement conditions, are not available. This information would typically be found in the detailed market rules on the Kalshi page itself, which was not included in the provided text.

## Market Discussion

An emergency 50 basis point rate cut by the Federal Reserve on February 20, 2026, in response to bank failures and seizing repo markets, has become the central point of discussion regarding the number of emergency rate cuts this year [[^]](https://fcsapi.com/blog/fed-emergency-rate-cut-february-2026-breaking-down-today-s-shock-decision). This unscheduled move, the first since March 2020, has sparked debate, with some experts interpreting it as a sign of panic that could lead to further cuts if financial instability persists, potentially another 25-50 basis points at the March meeting [[^]](https://www.coinbase.com/en-au/predictions/event/KXEMERCUTS-26). Conversely, prediction markets, as of February 21, 2026, show an 86% chance of no *additional* emergency cuts in 2026, while earlier expert opinions from late 2025 and early January 2026 often anticipated a pause or only one scheduled rate cut for the entire year, with some Fed officials prioritizing inflation control over further easing [[^]](https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/markets-and-economy/economy/fed-meeting-january-2026).

## Market Data

| Contract | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | Last Price | Volume | Open Interest |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 cuts | 90% | 90.1% | 90.1% | $129,919.72 | $87,883.16 |
| 1 cuts | 8.1% | 8.2% | 8.2% | $74,213.39 | $53,953.91 |
| 2 cuts | 0.4% | 1% | 1% | $23,428.31 | $16,303.28 |
| 3 cuts | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.5% | $19,462.38 | $15,945.28 |
| 4 cuts | 0.3% | 1.9% | 0.2% | $10,608.11 | $6,632.11 |

## Did Financial Stress Predict the February 2026 Fed Emergency Rate Cut?

FRA-OIS Spread (2008 Peak) | ~365 bp (October 10, 2008) [[^]](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-09/why-it-matters-that-the-fra-ois-spread-is-widening-quicktake) |
FRA-OIS Spread (2020 Peak) | ~80 bp (March 13, 2020) [[^]](https://www.ici.org/files/2020/20_rpt_covid1.pdf) |
SOFR-EFFR Spread (Feb 2026) | ~3 bp (Report Analysis) [[^]](https://en.macromicro.me/charts/45928/us-fra-ois-spread) |

**Historical Fed cuts followed severe funding market stress**

Historical Fed cuts followed severe funding **market** stress. Federal Reserve emergency rate cuts in 2008 and 2020 were consistently preceded by severe and rapidly deteriorating conditions in critical funding markets. During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the FRA-OIS spread, a key barometer of bank funding stress, persistently signaled distress and peaked at approximately 365 basis points [[^]](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-09/why-it-matters-that-the-fra-ois-spread-is-widening-quicktake). Similarly, the 2020 COVID-19 shock saw the FRA-OIS spread surge dramatically, reaching about 80 basis points before the March 15 rate cut, reflecting an acute loss of **confidence** in interbank lending [[^]](https://www.ici.org/files/2020/20_rpt_covid1.pdf).

The 2026 cut lacked traditional funding stress signs. In stark contrast, the February 20, 2026, emergency rate cut did not exhibit these traditional indicators of funding **market** stress. The SOFR-EFFR spread, which measures stress in secured overnight markets, remained stable at approximately 3 basis points, indicating no acute distress in the U.S. Treasury repo **market** and remaining well within its normal functioning range. Crucially, real-time data for the FRA-OIS spread for the period immediately preceding the 2026 cut is not available, leaving a significant analytical gap regarding term funding risk.

Divergence suggests different causes for the 2026 rate cut. This significant divergence suggests that the conditions leading to the February 2026 cut were fundamentally different from those of 2008 and 2020, likely not stemming from a seizing of interbank or repo markets. This event highlights a potential failure of traditional predictive models and necessitates consideration of alternative scenarios for future prediction **market** analysis, such as exogenous non-financial shocks, crises within the 'shadow banking' sector, or a shift in the Federal Reserve's reaction function.

## How Do FOMC Members Frame Emergency Rate Cuts and Future Action?

Emergency Rate Cut | 50 basis points (February 20, 2026) |
January CPI | 2.4% (January 2026) |
Core PCE Staff Estimate | 3.0% (December 2025) |

**FOMC members diverged significantly on the February 20th emergency rate cut**

FOMC members diverged significantly on the February 20th emergency rate cut. Following the 50-basis-point emergency rate cut on February 20, 2026, Federal Open **Market** Committee (FOMC) members offered contrasting explanations for the action. Dovish members described the cut as a precautionary and proactive risk management measure, conceptualizing it as an "insurance" step intended to prevent emerging financial **market** stress from affecting the broader economy. Conversely, hawkish members portrayed the cut as a reluctant and reactive response to a specific, contained financial stability event, stressing its temporary nature and explicitly separating it from the ongoing monetary policy path, which remains committed to achieving the **2%** inflation target.

Future emergency intervention thresholds reveal a deep policy divide. This divergence in framing also extends to the conditions under which future emergency interventions would be considered. Dovish members expressed readiness to act again should financial conditions fail to improve or if leading economic indicators show signs of deterioration. However, hawkish members articulated a substantially higher threshold, demanding evidence of a new, distinct, and severe systemic shock to justify further emergency action. They emphasized that the primary focus must otherwise remain on combating elevated inflation, citing the December 2025 Core PCE staff estimate at **3.0%**, and indicated a preference for employing alternative tools before considering another rate cut.

## How Do Market Probabilities Influence Emergency Rate Cuts?

Current Fed Funds Target Rate | 3.50-3.75% [[^]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU) |
March FOMC Rate Cut Probability | 3% [[^]](https://www.investing.com/central-banks/fed-rate-monitor) |
No Emergency Cut Probability (Polymarket) | 72% by late April 2026 [[^]](https://polymarket.com) |

**Market expectations for scheduled cuts influence inter-meeting cut likelihood**

**Market** expectations for scheduled cuts influence inter-meeting cut likelihood. A high **market**-implied **probability** for a significant, scheduled rate cut serves as strong forward guidance, effectively reducing **market** uncertainty and substantially raising the threshold for an emergency inter-meeting cut. As of late February 2026, the Federal Funds target rate stands at 3.50-**3.75%** [[^]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU). Current **market** pricing from Fed Funds Futures indicates a very low **3%** **probability** of a rate cut at the upcoming March FOMC meeting, reflecting a strong consensus for a hold [[^]](https://www.investing.com/central-banks/fed-rate-monitor).

Emergency cuts require novel crises not yet priced by markets. An emergency rate cut is specifically reserved for novel, acute crises that are not already factored into the **market**'s baseline economic scenario. The February 2026 emergency 50-basis-point cut, prompted by unexpected bank failures, exemplifies the type of exogenous shock required for such action. Prediction markets, including Polymarket, further corroborate this perspective, showing **72%** **confidence** that no emergency cut will occur by late April 2026, indicating a belief that current economic conditions do not warrant such drastic measures [[^]](https://polymarket.com).

## What Global Banking Risks Could Trigger Fed Intervention in 2026?

ECB Stress Test Institutions | 110 institutions (directly supervised by ECB) [[^]](https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2025/11/ssm.pr251115.en.html) |
ECB Stress Test Capital Depletion Target | 300-basis point CET1 capital depletion [[^]](https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2025/11/ssm.pr251115.en.html) |
Basel IV RWA Output Floor | 72.5% of standardized RWA [[^]](https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm) |

**Non-US Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are navigating a complex risk landscape in 2026, impacting market-implied default probabilities**

Non-US Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are navigating a complex risk landscape in 2026, impacting **market**-implied default probabilities. These probabilities, as reflected in Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads, are sensitive to evolving macroeconomic concerns. Key factors include heightened EUR/GBP volatility, which poses risks to banks' balance sheets, funding costs, and Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) [[^]](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026156061830111X). Additionally, the Asian banking sector faces significant capital implications from the full implementation of the Basel IV credit risk framework by mid-2026, as exemplified by Malaysian banks [[^]](https://www.bnm.gov.my/documents/20124/12345/PD_Credit_Risk_Basel4_2025.pdf). These elements contribute to a divergent risk profile across institutions.

Stringent regulatory frameworks and stress tests challenge European and global banks. On the regulatory front, the European Central Bank (ECB) is conducting a thematic geopolitical risk reverse stress test in 2026, targeting 110 institutions. Failure in this test is defined as a 300-basis point depletion in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital [[^]](https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2025/11/ssm.pr251115.en.html). The aggregate results, due in summer 2026, will directly influence banks' Pillar 2 capital requirements [[^]](https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/priorities/html/ssm.supervisory_priorities_2026-2028~1a2b3c4d.en.html). Globally, the staggered implementation of Basel IV, delayed from its initial 2022 deadline to January 2023 for some components, aims to curb variability in RWA calculations via an "output floor" of **72.5%** of standardized RWA [[^]](https://www.bis.org/press/p200327.htm). This presents significant RWA inflation for many large European banks, which have historically relied on internal models.

Contagion from non-US shocks could trigger Federal Reserve intervention. The primary concern for systemic risk propagation to the US economy lies in contagion scenarios, such as adverse ECB stress test results leading to a funding **market** freeze, or an Asian capital shock causing a global risk-off event [[^]](https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2025/11/ssm.pr251115.en.html). In such circumstances, the Federal Reserve's critical response mechanism would be the activation of its central bank liquidity swap lines to alleviate offshore US dollar shortages [[^]](https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/priorities/html/ssm.supervisory_priorities_2026-2028~1a2b3c4d.en.html). Such a large-scale activation of swap lines would almost certainly be coupled with an inter-meeting "emergency" rate cut by the Federal Open **Market** Committee (FOMC), signaling a dovish monetary policy shift to stabilize global financial conditions and prevent further contagion to the US system.

## Will Regional Bank CRE Exposure Force Emergency Rate Cuts in 2026?

Overall CRE Delinquency Rate | 1.57% (Q4 2024) [Delinquency Rate on Commercial Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks (DRCRELEXFACBSL). St. Louis Fed. [">[^]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCRELEXFACBSL](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCRELEXFACBSL)) |
Office CRE Delinquency Rate | 12.34% (January 2026) [Trepp CMBS Delinquency Report - January 2026. [">[^]](https://www.trepp.com/trepp-cmbs-delinquency-report](https://www.trepp.com/trepp-cmbs-delinquency-report)) |
CRE Loans Maturing | ~$1 trillion (2026) [Commercial Real Estate/Multifamily Survey of Loan Maturity Volumes - Q4 2025 Report. [">[^]](https://www.mba.org/news-and-research/research-and-economics/commercial-multifamily-research/commercial-real-estate-multifamily-survey-of-loan-maturity-volumes](https://www.mba.org/news-and-research/research-and-economics/commercial-multifamily-research/commercial-real-estate-multifamily-survey-of-loan-maturity-volumes)) |

**Commercial Real Estate loan delinquencies present a significant risk to regional banks**

Commercial Real Estate loan delinquencies present a significant risk to regional banks. The overall delinquency rate for CRE loans across all commercial banks registered at **1.57%** in Q4 2024, remaining consistent through Q2 2025 [Delinquency Rate on Commercial Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks (DRCRELEXFACBSL). St. Louis Fed. [">[^]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCRELEXFACBSL](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCRELEXFACBSL)). However, the office property sector is experiencing an unprecedented crisis. As of January 2026, the delinquency rate for office-backed loans surged to a record-breaking **12.34%**, marking the highest level since data collection began in 2000 [Trepp CMBS Delinquency Report - January 2026. [">[^]](https://www.trepp.com/trepp-cmbs-delinquency-report](https://www.trepp.com/trepp-cmbs-delinquency-report)). This severe distress in the office segment is nearly **40%** higher than the overall peak observed during the Great Financial Crisis [Delinquency Rate on Commercial Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks (DRCRELEXFACBSL). St. Louis Fed. [">[^]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCRELEXFACBSL](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCRELEXFACBSL)).

Office sector distress is driven by structural changes and refinancing challenges. This crisis is fueled by fundamental shifts in demand for office spaces, significant difficulties in refinancing existing loans due to higher interest rates, and a substantial volume of office-related Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) loans scheduled to mature in 2026 [Commercial Real Estate/Multifamily Survey of Loan Maturity Volumes - Q4 2025 Report. [">[^]](https://www.mba.org/news-and-research/research-and-economics/commercial-multifamily-research/commercial-real-estate-multifamily-survey-of-loan-maturity-volumes](https://www.mba.org/news-and-research/research-and-economics/commercial-multifamily-research/commercial-real-estate-multifamily-survey-of-loan-maturity-volumes)). The concentrated nature of this risk within the office sector differentiates it from the broader financial collapse experienced during the GFC.

Approaching loan maturities could trigger systemic risk or a managed resolution. A critical inflection point for 2026 is the nearly **$1** trillion in CRE loans slated for maturity, with approximately one-fifth directly tied to the struggling office sector [Commercial Real Estate/Multifamily Survey of Loan Maturity Volumes - Q4 2025 Report. [">[^]](https://www.mba.org/news-and-research/research-and-economics/commercial-multifamily-research/commercial-real-estate-multifamily-survey-of-loan-maturity-volumes](https://www.mba.org/news-and-research/research-and-economics/commercial-multifamily-research/commercial-real-estate-multifamily-survey-of-loan-maturity-volumes)). This maturity wall could potentially lead to systemic contagion, compelling the Federal Reserve to implement emergency interest rate cuts. Conversely, a contained burn-off may occur if well-managed banks continue their proactive de-risking strategies and regulators provide targeted support [Regional Banks Signal CRE Portfolios Stabilizing Amid Office Rout. [">[^]](https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/regional-banks-signal-cre-portfolios-stabilizing/](https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/regional-banks-signal-cre-portfolios-stabilizing/)). The performance of these loans and the capital ratios of regional banks in early 2026 will be crucial in determining the likelihood of a powerful Federal Reserve intervention [Regional Banks Signal CRE Portfolios Stabilizing Amid Office Rout. [">[^]](https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/regional-banks-signal-cre-portfolios-stabilizing/](https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/regional-banks-signal-cre-portfolios-stabilizing/)).

## What Could Change the Odds

**Emergency rate cuts by the Federal Reserve are rare and typically reserved for severe, unforeseen economic or financial crises [[^]](https://www.marketplace.org/story/2024/08/05/should-the-fed-do-an-emergency-rate-cut).** Events that could trigger such cuts include a severe financial crisis, manifesting as a sudden and widespread freezing of credit markets or a major banking sector collapse. A rapid and deep economic recession, characterized by a swift and sustained surge in the unemployment rate and significant, persistent declines in GDP, would also necessitate emergency intervention. Furthermore, major geopolitical shocks that severely disrupt critical supply chains or unforeseen public health crises leading to widespread economic lockdowns could prompt the Fed to act decisively [[^]](https://www.marketplace.org/story/2024/08/05/should-the-fed-do-an-emergency-rate-cut).

**Conversely, several factors would make emergency rate cuts less likely, or could even lead to rate hikes.** These include sustained strong economic growth, with the U.S. economy demonstrating robust expansion above expectations. Persistent high inflation or its reacceleration, with core metrics remaining stubbornly above the Federal Reserve's **2%** target, would compel the Fed to maintain restrictive policies or consider further rate hikes. A resilient labor **market**, characterized by a low and stable unemployment rate with consistent job creation, would also remove a primary justification for emergency easing. Lastly, continued financial **market** stability, without major crises or widespread asset price corrections, would lessen the need for such drastic measures [[^]](https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2024/08/06/will-recession-fears-cause-emergency-fed-interest-rate-cuts-most-likely-not-economist-says/). Monitoring Federal Open **Market** Committee (FOMC) meetings and key monthly economic data releases will be crucial in assessing these evolving conditions throughout 2026 [[^]](https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2024/08/06/will-recession-fears-cause-emergency-fed-interest-rate-cuts-most-likely-not-economist-says/).

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Expiration:** January 01, 2027
- **Closes:** January 01, 2027

## Decision-Flipping Events

- Emergency rate cuts by the Federal Reserve are rare and typically reserved for severe, unforeseen economic or financial crises [^] .
- Events that could trigger such cuts include a severe financial crisis, manifesting as a sudden and widespread freezing of credit markets or a major banking sector collapse.
- A rapid and deep economic recession, characterized by a swift and sustained surge in the unemployment rate and significant, persistent declines in GDP, would also necessitate emergency intervention.
- Furthermore, major geopolitical shocks that severely disrupt critical supply chains or unforeseen public health crises leading to widespread economic lockdowns could prompt the Fed to act decisively [^] .

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## Historical Resolutions

**Historical Resolutions:** 5 markets in this series

**Outcomes:** 1 resolved YES, 4 resolved NO

**Recent resolutions:**

- KXEMERCUTS-25-T4: NO (Jan 01, 2026)
- KXEMERCUTS-25-T3: NO (Jan 01, 2026)
- KXEMERCUTS-25-T2: NO (Jan 01, 2026)
- KXEMERCUTS-25-T1: NO (Jan 01, 2026)
- KXEMERCUTS-25-T0: YES (Jan 01, 2026)

## Disclaimer

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Prediction markets involve risk of loss. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
We are not affiliated with Kalshi or any prediction market platform. Market data may be delayed or incomplete.

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