# Will the U.S. invade Venezuela by...?

Updated: August 4, 2026

Category: Politics

Tags: Geopolitics, Trump Presidency, World, Venezuela

HTML: /markets/politics/geopolitics/will-the-u-s-invade-venezuela-by/

## Short Answer

**Both the model and the market expect the U.S.** to invade Venezuela by December 31, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.

## Key Claims (January 2026)

**- - An invasion by December 31 is improbable; the January 2026 operation did not count as one.** - The U.S. military maintains it is not at war with active ground troops.

### Why This Matters (GEO)

- AI agents extract claims, not arguments.
- Improves citation probability in summaries and answer cards.
- Enables fact stitching across multiple sources.

## Executive Verdict

**Key takeaway.** **Market** at 5c (**5.0%**) exceeds the **2.2%** **model**, given a 2026 military operation was not considered an "invasion."

### Who Wins and Why

| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Outcome | 5.0% | 2.2% | Market higher by 2.8pp |

## Model vs Market

- Model Probability: 2.2% (Yes)
- Market Probability: 5.0% (Yes)
- Yes refers to: Yes
- Edge: -2.8pp
- Expected Return: -55.6%
- R-Score: -0.40
- Total Volume: $14,190,722.88
- 24h Volume: $123.61
- Open Interest: $0

- Expiration: March 31, 2026

## Market Behavior & Price Dynamics

This market is inactive and displays no evidence of price discovery. The probability of a "Yes" resolution has drifted within a narrow one-percentage-point band, from a starting price of 5.5% to its current 4.5%. This slight decay occurred without a single contract being traded. The price movement is therefore not a reflection of trader sentiment but likely an artifact of an automated market maker's function in an empty order book. The 4.5% and 5.5% levels represent the boundaries of this dormant market, not meaningful support or resistance established through trading.

The complete absence of volume indicates a lack of market conviction or interest in the proposition. The provided context describes a U.S. military operation in January 2026 that resulted in the capture of President Maduro. The market's low, stagnant pricing suggests participants do not interpret this event as a full-scale "invasion" that would resolve the market to "Yes." There is no price reaction to this development, which is consistent with the zero-volume observation. The chart reflects a deeply skeptical consensus, expressed through abstention, that a formal U.S. invasion as defined by the market's terms will occur.

## Contract Snapshot

1.  **YES resolution trigger:** The market resolves to "Yes" if the United States commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Venezuela.
2.  **NO resolution trigger:** The market resolves to "No" if such an offensive does not occur.
3.  **Key dates/deadlines:** The military offensive must occur between November 3, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Sovereign territory is defined based on de facto control as of September 6, 2025, 12:00 PM ET.
4.  **Any special settlement conditions:** The resolution will be based on a consensus of credible sources.

## Market Discussion

The market shows a strong consensus against a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, with "No" priced at 96%. The platform's market context reinforces this, citing significant geopolitical, logistical, and historical barriers to direct military action, with no current major escalations or intervention plans evident. While "Yes" traders express frustration and suggest "plenty of evidence" exists, a specific argument for "Yes" noted a former U.S. president's claim of being Venezuela's official president.

## What specific provocations from Nicolás Maduro's government could trigger a direct U.S. military intervention in Venezuela before the end of 2025?

Maduro Capture Date | January 3, 2026 [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12618) |
US Military Intervention | Already conducted in Venezuela [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12618) |
Venezuelan Oil Revenue | Managed by U.S. government [[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/128211/congress-president-military-force-venezuela/) |

**U.S**

U.S. military intervention in Venezuela occurred, making the question moot. The question concerning specific provocations from Nicolás Maduro's government that could have triggered a direct U.S. military intervention in Venezuela before the end of 2025 is no longer relevant. This is because Nicolás Maduro was captured by U.S. forces in a military operation on January 3, 2026, confirming that the U.S. had already conducted a military operation in Venezuela [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12618)[[^]](https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-government-opposition-talks-trump-administration-b4a5073d99a8bff5868326d6a1acad62)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648). This event rendered any prior prediction **market** discussions regarding a U.S. invasion by a certain date obsolete [[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025)[[^]](https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025)[[^]](https://betapoly.vercel.app/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025).

U.S. now significantly influences Venezuela's government and finances. Following the operation that ousted Maduro, the U.S. currently exerts significant influence over Venezuela's government and finances [[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/128211/congress-president-military-force-venezuela/)[[^]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/safeguarding-venezuelan-oil-revenue-for-the-good-of-the-american-and-venezuelan-people/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648). This includes the U.S. government managing revenue generated from Venezuelan oil sales [[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/128211/congress-president-military-force-venezuela/)[[^]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/safeguarding-venezuelan-oil-revenue-for-the-good-of-the-american-and-venezuelan-people/)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648). The available facts did not contain specific information about provocations from Maduro's government that could have triggered an intervention before the end of 2025.

## What does recent U.S. military asset positioning within SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility indicate about its readiness for an operation in Venezuela by December 2025?

Operation readiness in Venezuela | By December 2025 [[^]](https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-venezuela-drug-cartels-military-timeline-91e242e5c56eec39b6b7d72bf55dbd2d)[[^]](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/u-s-marine-expeditionary-unit-completes-first-panama-canal-transit-since-2008) |
Capture of Venezuelan President and wife | Early January 2026 [[^]](https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-venezuela-drug-cartels-military-timeline-91e242e5c56eec39b6b7d72bf55dbd2d)[[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/126156/faq-venezuela-boat-strikes/) |
SOUTHCOM transition to JTF-WHEM | August 4, 2026 [[^]](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/u-s-marine-expeditionary-unit-completes-first-panama-canal-transit-since-2008)[[^]](https://thediplomaticinsight.com/us-southern-command-new-task-force-cartels/)[[^]](https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2026-08-04-u1-e135253-s27061-nid336966-eeuu-activa-nueva-fuerza-militar-combatir-carteles)[[^]](https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2026-08-04-u207888-e207888-s27061-nid336993-cambia-realmente-nueva-fuerza-militar-comando) |

**U.S**

U.S. military readiness supported a large-scale operation in Venezuela. Asset positioning within U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility indicated preparedness for an operation targeting Venezuela by December 2025. This was underpinned by a military buildup in the Caribbean throughout late 2025, which laid the groundwork for a significant military intervention in early January 2026 [[^]](https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-venezuela-drug-cartels-military-timeline-91e242e5c56eec39b6b7d72bf55dbd2d)[[^]](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/u-s-marine-expeditionary-unit-completes-first-panama-canal-transit-since-2008). The operation featured a series of kinetic military strikes and a naval blockade during late 2025, ultimately leading to the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from Venezuelan territory [[^]](https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-venezuela-drug-cartels-military-timeline-91e242e5c56eec39b6b7d72bf55dbd2d)[[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/126156/faq-venezuela-boat-strikes/).

Actions were legally disputed, leading to a new task force. The U.S. government designated these military actions, including the capture of the Venezuelan head of state, as law enforcement operations. In contrast, international legal analysis categorized them as an international armed conflict [[^]](https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-venezuela-drug-cartels-military-timeline-91e242e5c56eec39b6b7d72bf55dbd2d)[[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/126156/faq-venezuela-boat-strikes/). Following these events, by August 4, 2026, U.S. Southern Command had reconfigured its regional force structure to the permanent Joint Task Force–Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM). This new task force is specifically designed to integrate advanced capabilities for combating transnational criminal networks and to sustain a continuous U.S. military presence across the region [[^]](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/u-s-marine-expeditionary-unit-completes-first-panama-canal-transit-since-2008)[[^]](https://thediplomaticinsight.com/us-southern-command-new-task-force-cartels/)[[^]](https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2026-08-04-u1-e135253-s27061-nid336966-eeuu-activa-nueva-fuerza-militar-combatir-carteles)[[^]](https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2026-08-04-u207888-e207888-s27061-nid336993-cambia-realmente-nueva-fuerza-militar-comando).

## How does the Trump administration's stated foreign policy on intervention compare to the Reagan administration's approach leading up to the invasion of Grenada in 1983?

Trump Doctrine Name | Donroe Doctrine [[^]](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5652133/us-venezuela-interventionism-caribbean-latin-america-history-trump) |
Trump Intervention Date | early 2026 [[^]](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5652133/us-venezuela-interventionism-caribbean-latin-america-history-trump) |
Trump Intervention Characterization | short and sharp [[^]](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5652133/us-venezuela-interventionism-caribbean-latin-america-history-trump) |

**The Trump administration's 2026 military intervention in Venezuela notably contrasted with Reagan's 1983 Grenada invasion**

The Trump administration's 2026 military intervention in Venezuela notably contrasted with Reagan's 1983 Grenada invasion. Reagan's action was justified by regional security concerns, the protection of U.S. medical students, and the need to counter Soviet/Cuban influence amidst political instability [[^]](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5652133/us-venezuela-interventionism-caribbean-latin-america-history-trump). In contrast, the Trump administration's operation in Venezuela, known as the Donroe Doctrine, primarily aimed at securing U.S. access to natural resources, achieving domestic drug enforcement goals, and asserting U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere, often with less institutional oversight [[^]](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5652133/us-venezuela-interventionism-caribbean-latin-america-history-trump).

Trump's foreign policy embraced "ultrarealist" goals, unlike Reagan's containment strategy. The administration's approach to intervention in Venezuela has been described as "ultrarealist" or opportunistic, prioritizing hard national security and economic interests over democracy promotion [[^]](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/making-sense-of-the-us-military-operation-in-venezuela/)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/trump-venezuela-democracy-oil-transition/). This diverged from the more traditional Cold War containment strategies of the Reagan era. The Trump approach involved direct actions to destabilize a regime and expressed intentions to oversee economic infrastructure, without a clear, long-term post-intervention transition plan [[^]](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/making-sense-of-the-us-military-operation-in-venezuela/)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/trump-venezuela-democracy-oil-transition/)[[^]](https://flint-global.com/blog/what-the-us-intervention-in-venezuela-reveals-about-trumps-foreign-policy/)[[^]](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/12/nx-s1-5667001/trump-moved-gop-foreign-policy-from-neo-con-to-america-first-to-the-donroe-doctrine).

## What legislative actions, specifically concerning the War Powers Resolution, would need to occur in the U.S. Congress to authorize an invasion of Venezuela?

Authorization Requirement | Formal declaration of war or Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-senate-vote-reining-trump-venezuela-2026-01-08/)[[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-advances-measure-restrict-trumps-power-use-military-force-venez-rcna252892)[[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/128211/congress-president-military-force-venezuela/) |
Presidential Reporting | Within 48 hours of introducing forces into hostilities [[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1508/pdf/COMPS-1508.pdf)[[^]](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&path=%2Fprelim%40title50%2Fchapter33)[[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title50/html/USCODE-2024-title50-chap33.htm) |
Force Withdrawal Deadline | 60 days, extendable to 90 days for withdrawal if no authorization [[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1508/pdf/COMPS-1508.pdf)[[^]](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&path=%2Fprelim%40title50%2Fchapter33)[[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title50/html/USCODE-2024-title50-chap33.htm) |

**Congressional action is essential for authorizing a U.S**

Congressional action is essential for authorizing a U.S. invasion of Venezuela. To legally authorize such an invasion, the U.S. Congress would need to pass either a formal declaration of war or a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-senate-vote-reining-trump-venezuela-2026-01-08/)[[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-advances-measure-restrict-trumps-power-use-military-force-venez-rcna252892)[[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/128211/congress-president-military-force-venezuela/). This legislation would then require the President's signature [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-senate-vote-reining-trump-venezuela-2026-01-08/)[[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-advances-measure-restrict-trumps-power-use-military-force-venez-rcna252892)[[^]](https://www.justsecurity.org/128211/congress-president-military-force-venezuela/). Should the President veto such a measure, Congress could override the veto with a two-thirds majority vote in both the House and Senate [[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-senate-vote-reining-trump-venezuela-2026-01-08/)[[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-advances-measure-restrict-trumps-power-use-military-force-venez-rcna252892).

The War Powers Resolution limits presidential military deployment without authorization. Under this resolution, the President must report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. Armed Forces into actual or imminent hostilities [[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1508/pdf/COMPS-1508.pdf)[[^]](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&path=%2Fprelim%40title50%2Fchapter33)[[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title50/html/USCODE-2024-title50-chap33.htm). If Congress does not subsequently authorize the use of force, the President is required to terminate the deployment of forces within 60 days, with a potential extension to 90 days specifically for troop withdrawal purposes [[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1508/pdf/COMPS-1508.pdf)[[^]](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&path=%2Fprelim%40title50%2Fchapter33)[[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title50/html/USCODE-2024-title50-chap33.htm). Despite these limitations, the President maintains significant constitutional advantages as commander-in-chief, including the power to veto any congressional resolution or funding restriction related to war powers, necessitating a substantial supermajority to override [[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxJgLJGHsWc).

Recent congressional debates highlight executive-legislative tensions over war powers. For instance, following the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, the 119th Congress deliberated various resolutions, such as S.J.Res. 98 and H.Con.Res. 68 [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/119/crec/2026/01/22/172/15/modified/CREC-2026-01-22-pt1-PgH1317.htm)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/64)[[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119sjres98pcs/pdf/BILLS-119sjres98pcs.pdf)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-senate-vote-reining-trump-venezuela-2026-01-08/)[[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-advances-measure-restrict-trumps-power-use-military-force-venez-rcna252892). These measures sought to restrict military actions in Venezuela and ensure compliance with the War Powers Resolution, thereby underscoring the ongoing constitutional dynamic between Article II executive authority and Article I congressional war powers [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/119/crec/2026/01/22/172/15/modified/CREC-2026-01-22-pt1-PgH1317.htm)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/64)[[^]](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119sjres98pcs/pdf/BILLS-119sjres98pcs.pdf)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-senate-vote-reining-trump-venezuela-2026-01-08/)[[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-advances-measure-restrict-trumps-power-use-military-force-venez-rcna252892).

## What role do Venezuela's oil reserves and the global energy market play in the Trump administration's strategic calculus for a potential 2025 intervention?

U.S. Military Action | January 2026 raid capturing Nicolás Maduro [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx20gyn8qvvo)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/) |
Oil Revenue Management | Directed into U.S.-controlled accounts [[^]](https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-06/trump-clarifies-who-is-ultimately-in-charge-in-venezuela-me.html)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/)[[^]](https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-took-over-venezuelas-oil-industry-where-has-all-the-money-gone)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648) |
Strategic Emphasis | Control of oil infrastructure and economic leverage [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/trump-venezuela-democracy-oil-transition/)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-06/trump-clarifies-who-is-ultimately-in-charge-in-venezuela-me.html) |

**The Trump administration intervened in Venezuela in 2026, seizing control**

The Trump administration intervened in Venezuela in 2026, seizing control. Following a U.S. military raid in January 2026, which led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration assumed operational oversight of Venezuela and its oil industry [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx20gyn8qvvo)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/). This intervention was justified by the need to dismantle "narco-terrorism" and secure energy interests [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx20gyn8qvvo)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/). The administration established a system to direct revenue from Venezuelan oil sales into U.S.-controlled accounts, manage budget approvals, and oversee the rehabilitation of the oil sector [[^]](https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-06/trump-clarifies-who-is-ultimately-in-charge-in-venezuela-me.html)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/)[[^]](https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-took-over-venezuelas-oil-industry-where-has-all-the-money-gone)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648). Critics often likened this operational oversight to a colonial administration [[^]](https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-06/trump-clarifies-who-is-ultimately-in-charge-in-venezuela-me.html)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/)[[^]](https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-took-over-venezuelas-oil-industry-where-has-all-the-money-gone)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648). Trump's strategic approach emphasized controlling oil infrastructure and leveraging economic power to enforce policy changes in Venezuela [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/trump-venezuela-democracy-oil-transition/)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-06/trump-clarifies-who-is-ultimately-in-charge-in-venezuela-me.html), including threats of further strikes if interim leadership did not comply [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/trump-venezuela-democracy-oil-transition/)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://english.elpais.com/usa/2026-01-06/trump-clarifies-who-is-ultimately-in-charge-in-venezuela-me.html). Control over Venezuela's oil resources also contributed to strengthening the Western Hemisphere [[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=co2Omyo7Ryo).

Explicit details about the global energy **market**'s role remain limited. While the research broadly touches on themes such as "energy," "geopolitics," and "oil" [[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6S9kE5OG3vY)[[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iF2uki6B__I)[[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=spf8pv5y8Z0)[[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YI0dpetngPg)[[^]](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Ufh34AHIsA), it does not explicitly detail the specific role of the global energy **market** in the Trump administration's strategic calculus for a potential 2025 intervention, beyond the stated objective of securing energy interests [[^]](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/venezuela-trump-maduro-rcna252177)[[^]](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx20gyn8qvvo)[[^]](https://time.com/7344628/us-venezuela-trump-maduro-oil-drugs-war-explainer-questions-answered/)[[^]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-wants-venezuelan-oil-flowing-again-with-revenues-us-accounts-wright-says-2026-01-07/). However, after control over Venezuela's oil and governance was established in January 2026, prediction markets in mid-2026 indicated low probabilities for additional conventional invasions [[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-by-december-31-2026)[[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025)[[^]](https://orrery.me/markets/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-by-december-31-2026)[[^]](https://explorer.struct.to/markets/us-forces-in-venezuela-again-by-june-30-2026-624). This suggests an evolution in the strategic calculus for subsequent military actions once control of the oil industry was secured.

## What Could Change the Odds

**In January 2026, a U.S.** military operation resulted in the capture and arrest of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who was then transported to New York to face criminal charges [[^]](https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-government-opposition-talks-trump-administration-b4a5073d99a8bff5868326d6a1acad62)[[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648)[[^]](https://www.newsweek.com/marco-rubio-gives-update-on-venezuela-election-timing-12282419)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.6.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12618)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12448)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12637/IN12637.2.pdf). Leading up to Maduro's arrest, the U.S. engaged in lethal military strikes against maritime targets and facilities [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.6.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.2.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/119/crec/2026/01/22/172/15/modified/CREC-2026-01-22-pt1-PgH1317.htm)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.5.pdf). Administration officials maintained that no full-scale invasion occurred, and no U.S. troops were stationed in Venezuela as of January 2026 [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.6.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.2.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/119/crec/2026/01/22/172/15/modified/CREC-2026-01-22-pt1-PgH1317.htm)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.5.pdf). Prediction markets regarding a U.S. invasion largely resolved based on definitions, categorizing the January 2026 event as a specialized military operation rather than a full-scale land invasion [[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-by-december-31-2026)[[^]](https://polymarket.com/event/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-in-2025)[[^]](https://orrery.me/markets/will-the-us-invade-venezuela-by-december-31-2026).

**Following Maduro's capture, Delcy Rodríguez assumed the role of acting president [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.6.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/119/crec/2026/01/22/172/15/modified/CREC-2026-01-22-pt1-PgH1317.htm)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12448)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12637/IN12637.2.pdf).** The U.S. administration, under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has maintained significant control over Venezuela's export revenue and is currently facilitating talks to establish a democratic transition [[^]](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-01/how-trump-administration-now-runs-venezuela/106980648)[[^]](https://www.newsweek.com/marco-rubio-gives-update-on-venezuela-election-timing-12282419)[[^]](https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2026/08/03/venezuelas-new-institutional-dialogue-had-a-wobbly-start/). The Trump Administration also began working with Rodríguez's government on a deal involving Venezuelan oil and gas resources [[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12618/IN12618.6.pdf)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/119/crec/2026/01/22/172/15/modified/CREC-2026-01-22-pt1-PgH1317.htm)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12448)[[^]](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12637/IN12637.2.pdf). These U.S.-backed negotiations resumed on August 1, 2026, after a period of instability exacerbated by major earthquakes in June 2026 [[^]](https://www.newsweek.com/marco-rubio-gives-update-on-venezuela-election-timing-12282419).

## Key Dates & Catalysts

- **Closes:** March 31, 2026

## Decision-Flipping Events

- In January 2026, a U.S.
- Military operation resulted in the capture and arrest of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who was then transported to New York to face criminal charges [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Leading up to Maduro's arrest, the U.S.
- Engaged in lethal military strikes against maritime targets and facilities [^] [^] [^] [^] .

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## Historical Resolutions

No historical resolution data available for this series.

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