Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through...?
Yes refers to: August 31
Short Answer
Both the model and the market expect the Israel-Iran ceasefire to continue through July 18, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.
1. Executive Verdict
- Ceasefire continuation expected through early August, as reported actions did not trigger qualifying military action.
- Probability of ceasefire continuing diminishes for later August due to escalating hostilities.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| August 31 | 76.0% | 65.6% | The longest duration market faces highest exposure to risk from ongoing escalation of hostilities. |
Current Context
A formal, sustained ceasefire between Israel/US and Iran is not in place. As of August 4, 2026, previous attempts at a lasting cessation of hostilities, including an April ceasefire and a June memorandum of understanding, have repeatedly collapsed [^][^][^]. The conflict is instead characterized as a "ceasefire war," marked by brief, intermittent pauses in military activity frequently interrupted by renewed attacks, such as strikes on commercial shipping and US naval blockades [^][^][^][^]. Diplomatic efforts are currently focused on a potential bilateral deal between Iran and Oman to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with US officials suggesting an agreement is days away. Iran, however, denies direct negotiations with the US are occurring [^][^][^][^][^]. On August 2, 2026, parameters for a deal to end the war between Israel and Iran were reportedly reached, with President Trump stating he would order a halt to strikes once finalized [^].
The conflict significantly escalated in early 2026, establishing current tensions. A major strike on February 28, 2026, destroyed the compound of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killing top Iranian officials, and was followed by large-scale Iranian missile retaliations against Israel throughout March 2026 [^][^][^][^][^]. US commitments to ceasefires with Iran have historically not stopped Israeli attacks, particularly in Lebanon [^]. Public opinion in the US during March 2026 showed that 59% of Americans believed US military action against Iran had gone too far, creating significant political liability for the administration [^]. Broader Middle East peace plans and Hamas disarmament agreements are also factors in the regional dynamic [^][^]. The conflict has resulted in over 1.5 billion barrels of cumulative supply loss from the Middle East [^].
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
This market opened with an 82.0% probability and has trended upward to a current price of 99.9%. The price action has been volatile, with a notable 16.0 percentage point drop on July 31, followed by a sharp 19.2 percentage point spike on August 2. The July 31 decline from 90.0% to 74.0% appears to have been driven by concerns over the fragility of the ceasefire as a separate, earlier-expiring contract approached its deadline. The subsequent rally to 99.8% on August 2 was likely a reaction to reports of intensified Iranian social media influence operations ahead of the October 2026 Israeli election, which the market may have interpreted as a substitute for direct military engagement.
The price has ranged between 48.5% and a ceiling near 100.0%. The current price of 99.9% suggests the market is assigning a near-certainty to the de-facto ceasefire holding through the contract period. However, with zero contracts traded throughout the market's history, these price movements do not reflect broad market participation or conviction. The price is likely determined by an automated market maker or a very limited number of participants, and the swings in probability indicate reactions to news flow rather than a liquid, two-sided market discovering a consensus price.
3. Significant Price Movements
Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.
Outcome: August 31
📈 August 04, 2026: 11.5pp spike
Price increased from 65.0% to 76.5%
What happened: On August 4, 2026, news reports indicated escalating tensions and military actions between the US, Israel, and Iran, including a cargo ship attack in the Strait of Hormuz and new US strikes against Iran [^][^][^][^][^]. This environment, characterized by President Trump's warnings and continued conflict, would typically decrease the perceived likelihood of a ceasefire continuing, suggesting a market drop rather than an 11.5 percentage point spike [^]. Furthermore, the specific "11.5pp" movement in the research refers to a fall in US-Iran permanent peace odds on May 11, 2026, not a spike for an Israel-Iran ceasefire on August 4, 2026 [^]. Therefore, the provided information does not identify a primary driver for an 11.5pp spike in this market on the specified date, and there's no evidence of social media being a primary driver or contributing accelerant.
📈 July 30, 2026: 11.0pp spike
Price increased from 49.5% to 60.5%
What happened: The primary driver of the 11.0 percentage point spike on July 30, 2026, was the direct escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict, with the U.S. launching a "heavy wave" of strikes on Iran following Iranian missile attacks on U.S. forces [^][^][^][^]. This significant military action on July 30, 2026, generated a substantial spike in both traditional news and social media activity, diminishing the likelihood of a ceasefire continuing through August 31 [^]. While the social media activity coincided with the price move, it primarily served to amplify the breaking news of the military escalation. Thus, traditional news of the conflict escalation was the primary driver, with social media acting as a contributing accelerant.
Outcome: August 9
📈 August 02, 2026: 33.0pp spike
Price increased from 55.0% to 88.0%
What happened: The primary driver of the price movement was likely a surge in Iranian influence operations on social media platforms, including X and Telegram, which intensified ahead of the October 2026 Israeli election [^]. These campaigns utilized AI-generated disinformation and bot networks to influence Israeli public opinion, potentially by disseminating narratives promoting temporary stability or de-escalation [^][^][^][^]. This activity, coinciding with the August 2, 2026, date, appears to have increased market confidence that the existing shaky ceasefire would continue through August 9 [^][^]. Social media was a primary driver.
Outcome: August 1
📈 August 01, 2026: 15.7pp spike
Price increased from 84.0% to 99.7%
What happened: The primary driver of the 15.7 percentage point spike in the "Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 1, 2026" market appears to be optimistic news regarding diplomatic efforts, rather than social media activity. Although no stable ceasefire was active as of August 4, 2026 [^][^][^][^][^], diplomatic negotiations mediated by Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan were reportedly in "very progressive stages" for reopening the Strait of Hormuz as a first phase toward a broader settlement [^][^][^][^][^]. This traditional news of progress in de-escalation efforts likely led the market spike around August 1, 2026 [^][^][^][^][^]. Concurrently, social media activity around August 1, 2026, focused on Israeli election interference and digital manipulation [^][^][^], making it mostly noise to the ceasefire market.
Outcome: August 15
📉 July 31, 2026: 26.0pp drop
Price decreased from 73.5% to 47.5%
What happened: On July 31, 2026, the 26.0 percentage point drop in the market "Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 15" appears primarily driven by the ongoing fragility of the ceasefire and the absence of a comprehensive resolution as the deadline approached. While there is no specific social media activity or singular negative news event identified for July 31 [research does not provide], the broader context describes a "tenuous" ceasefire with "sporadic military clashes continuing" and "uncertain" talks [^][^][^]. This likely led market participants to significantly lower confidence in the existing ceasefire holding for the specified period [^][^]. Social media was not a primary driver, as no relevant activity was found.
4. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
This prediction market resolves "Yes" if a state of ceasefire remains in effect between Israel and Iran through the listed date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time (IRST). It resolves "No" if either country initiates a qualifying military action, defined as an air or surface-to-surface missile strike directly impacting the other's terrestrial territory or internal waters, before that deadline. Actions like intercepted munitions, ground incursions, cyber operations, or artillery fire are explicitly excluded, and in cases of conflicting reports about a qualifying action, the market may remain open for up to three full calendar days (IRST) to establish a consensus from official and credible sources.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| August 31 | $0.77 | $0.24 | 76% |
Market Discussion
As of August 4, 2026, there is no stable ceasefire between Israel/US and Iran, with the conflict ongoing through US naval blockades, exchange of strikes, and a volatile situation in the Strait of Hormuz [^][^][^][^][^][^]. While mediators report progressive negotiations, particularly for reopening the Strait, Iran denies direct talks with the US, and incidents—such as a cargo ship strike on August 4—continue to undermine stability [^][^][^][^]. The upcoming Israeli legislative election, scheduled for October 27, 2026, presents a dynamic contest between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eizenkot, adding another geopolitical factor to the region [^][^][^][^][^].
5. Trader Dashboard
A deterministic, per-market integrity scorecard computed from order-book and price data. Higher is better for Trader Trust, Liquidity, Move Quality and Resolution; higher means more risk for Quote Risk and Avoid Risk.
August 2PrimaryTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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July 18Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 20Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 22Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 25Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 31Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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August 15Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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August 31Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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July 23Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 24Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 26Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 27Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 28Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 29Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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July 30Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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August 9Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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August 1Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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August 3Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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August 4Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
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trader_dashboard_lean_v1.13 · computed Aug 4, 2026
6. What specific military actions by Israel or Iranian-backed forces would most likely trigger a collapse of the current ceasefire before August 2026?
| Primary Collapse Triggers | Air strike or surface-to-surface missile strike impacting other country's territory [^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Historical Collapse Actions | Iran launching missiles toward Israel or direct strikes in the Strait of Hormuz [^][^][^] |
| Ceasefire Established | June 24, 2025 [^] |
Direct military actions are the most probable triggers for ceasefire collapse. The most likely triggers for a collapse of the current ceasefire before August 2026 are qualifying military actions, specifically an air strike or surface-to-surface missile strike, that impacts the other country's territory [^][^][^][^]. This ceasefire, established on June 24, 2025, following a war that began on June 13, 2025, remains highly fragile [^][^]. As of March 2026, the ongoing tension is evident as residents in Israel continue to utilize underground shelters in response to incoming missile alerts from Iran [^][^].
Historical precedents reveal specific actions that unravel ceasefires. Historically, such ceasefire collapses have involved direct military exchanges, including Iran launching missiles toward Israel [^][^] and direct strikes in the Strait of Hormuz, often tied to disputes over shipping routes [^][^]. Another significant driver is the linkage between the U.S.-Iran conflict and the conflict in Lebanon, where Iranian retaliation for Israeli strikes in Lebanon previously resulted in direct Israel-Iran missile exchanges [^][^]. More recently, as of May 2026, drone strikes on regional infrastructure have been identified as potential threats that could contribute to the ceasefire's breakdown [^].
7. What public statements and diplomatic actions from the US, Israel, and Iran since late July 2026 support the market's high confidence in a sustained ceasefire?
| US-Iran hostilities pause duration | Over a week (since late July 2026) [^][^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| US-Iran negotiations status | Described as 'very progressive stages' [^][^][^] |
| Market Confidence Factor | Absence of direct military escalation since late July 2026 [^][^][^][^][^][^][^][^][^] |
Market confidence is high due to a sustained pause in US-Iran hostilities. This high market confidence in a sustained ceasefire since late July 2026 primarily reflects a de facto pause in US-Iran hostilities lasting over a week [^][^][^][^][^]. This pause is largely attributed to US military-enforced restraint and intense mediation efforts by Qatar, Pakistan, and Oman [^][^][^][^][^][^]. The absence of direct military escalation, such as air or missile strikes, since the pause began is a key factor supporting this market confidence [^][^][^][^][^][^][^][^][^].
Diplomatic efforts for a phased resolution are progressing, despite public denials. Diplomatic efforts are underway for a short-term 'phased' resolution, with Qatari and US officials characterizing negotiations as being in 'very progressive stages' [^][^][^]. These talks are expected to commence with the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping [^][^][^]. Despite Tehran's public denials of direct negotiations with the US, President Trump has referred to the ongoing discussions as a 'last chance' to prevent further military action [^][^][^][^][^][^]. He also indicated a 'good chance' of progress and had called off Iran strikes [^][^][^][^][^][^].
Israel has not publicly contributed to a direct ceasefire with Iran. Research indicates no evidence of a new ceasefire agreement or sustained diplomatic efforts specifically between Israel and Iran during late July or early August 2026 [^][^][^][^][^]. While a US-Iran breakthrough is reportedly anticipated by mediators ahead of a meeting between Netanyahu and Trump, specific public statements or diplomatic actions directly from Israel supporting a sustained ceasefire with Iran in this period are not detailed [^].
8. How do the publicly stated objectives for a long-term resolution from the Trump administration differ from those of Iran's leadership?
| Trump Admin Core Nuclear Goals | Prevent nuclear weapons, destroy ballistic missiles, restrict uranium enrichment long-term [^] |
|---|---|
| Iran Leadership Demands | Lift sanctions, reparations, return frozen assets, sovereign rights, civilian nuclear program [^] |
| US-Iran Deal Status | Trump says not to rush, but deal is "largely negotiated" [^][^] |
The Trump administration objectives target nuclear, missile, and enrichment limitations on Iran. Its long-term goals focus on preventing nuclear weapons acquisition, destroying ballistic missile capabilities, and securing long-term restrictions on uranium enrichment [^]. While earlier stances included strict non-enrichment and even potential regime change, recent indications suggest a willingness to accept some enrichment if it is "satisfactorily handled" [^]. The administration's broader strategy involves imposing maximum financial pressure, isolating the Iranian regime, and dismantling the Iran nuclear deal [^][^]. Instead, it prefers containment strategies, which include forming regional alliances against Iran and proposing redevelopment plans for Gaza [^][^]. Despite tough rhetoric, Trump has indicated that a peace deal with Iran is "largely negotiated," though he has advised against rushing it [^][^].
Iran seeks sanction relief, reparations, asset return, and sovereign recognition. Iran's leadership aims for the lifting of US and UN sanctions, reparations for damages caused by US-Israeli strikes, and the return of frozen assets [^]. Additionally, it seeks formal recognition of its sovereign rights, particularly concerning transit through the Strait of Hormuz, all while maintaining its right to a civilian nuclear program [^]. Historically, Iran has rejected US-led nuclear deal terms and regional containment efforts, viewing US sanctions as hostile and maintaining support for regional proxies [^]. Internally, there is significant disagreement within the leadership, with a pragmatic faction, led by President Pezeshkian, prioritizing a negotiated deal to alleviate economic hardship, while other elements continue to reject US demands [^]. Iran blames US demands for stalled talks but vows to pursue diplomacy, even as Supreme Leader Khamenei maintains tough rhetoric with the US despite ongoing nuclear discussions [^][^].
9. What real-time data on commercial shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is available to verify de-escalation between US and Iranian naval forces?
| Strait Closure Date | August 4, 2026 (due to conflict that began February 28, 2026) [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Pre-Crisis Daily Transits | Over 150 (daily) [^][^][^][^] |
| Current Daily Transits | Single digits or low double digits [^][^][^][^] |
Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is currently closed. As of August 4, 2026, commercial shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is reported to be closed due to an ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran that commenced on February 28, 2026 [^][^]. Monitoring of commercial shipping in the Strait is typically conducted using Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, with platforms such as HormuzMonitor, Straits.live, and War Intel Hub tracking vessel movements and behavior in real-time [^][^][^][^]. Additional insights from AP newsroom visual reports and shipping industry tracking tools also document the blockage and diversion of vessels [^][^][^].
Shipping traffic remains severely depressed, hindering de-escalation verification. Following the conflict, shipping traffic through the Strait remains severely depressed, hovering at near two-month lows [^][^][^][^]. Daily transits have drastically reduced to single digits or low double digits, a stark contrast to the over 150 daily transits observed in pre-crisis periods [^][^][^][^]. However, verifying de-escalation through AIS data alone has become increasingly unreliable because vessels frequently disable their AIS transponders to avoid detection or broadcast false credentials. This practice makes active AIS-monitored counts a "confirmed floor" rather than a true reflection of total traffic, thus limiting its effectiveness for verifying de-escalation [^][^][^][^].
10. What are the key remaining obstacles in the Iran-Oman negotiations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and how could a failure impact the broader ceasefire?
| Negotiation Obstacles | Disagreements over technical framework for maritime traffic (e.g., single corridor) and implementation of shared "service fees" [^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Tehran's Core Demands | Guarantees regarding the lifting of banking restrictions and maritime blockades on oil exports [^][^][^] |
| Negotiation Status (July 2026) | In a state of crisis following renewed Iranian attacks and reimposition of a U.S. blockade [^][^][^] |
The ongoing Iran-Oman negotiations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz face significant obstacles. Key disagreements include establishing a technical framework for maritime traffic, such as replacing multiple routes with a single intermediate corridor, and implementing 'service fees' for security and environmental management to be shared by Iran and Oman [^][^][^]. Additionally, Tehran is demanding guarantees regarding the lifting of banking restrictions and maritime blockades on its oil exports [^][^][^]. These critical talks are strictly between Oman and Iran, without direct involvement from the United States [^][^].
Negotiations are in crisis following renewed attacks and a US blockade. As of July 2026, the discussions are in a state of crisis, exacerbated by renewed Iranian attacks on ships in the waterway and a subsequent reimposition of a U.S. blockade [^][^][^]. A tentative deal to reopen the waterway, reached in mid-July 2026, had previously collapsed due to mutual accusations of violations and conflicting claims of control over the Strait [^][^].
Failure risks broader ceasefire collapse amid regional volatility and attacks. A complete failure in these negotiations risks the collapse of the broader June 18 memorandum of understanding, which currently underpins a fragile ceasefire between Iran and a U.S.-backed coalition [^][^][^]. The extreme volatility of the situation is further highlighted by incidents such as an attack on a cargo vessel near Oman in early August 2026 and conflicting public accounts between the U.S. and Iran [^][^][^]. Prediction markets concerning the Israel-Iran ceasefire continuing through various dates in August 2026 generally show high volatility, with an implied 74-78% probability of the ceasefire holding through the mid-to-late part of the month; however, these probabilities remain sensitive to real-time geopolitical triggers such as the Strait of Hormuz negotiations and potential military escalations [^][^][^]. The broader regional conflict also actively influences domestic U.S. political discourse and campaigns in mid-2026 [^].
11. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
As of August 4, 2026, no stable ceasefire exists between Israel/US and Iran; previous agreements, including a mid-June memorandum, have repeatedly collapsed. Tensions remain extremely high following an attack on a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz on August 4, 2026 [^][^][^][^][^]. The Israel-Iran war of 2025, a 12-day conflict which began on June 13, 2025, concluded with a ceasefire agreement on June 24, 2025 [^]. As of August 2026, this ceasefire is characterized as tenuous and volatile, with ongoing tensions marked by incidents such as a drone strike on a UAE nuclear power plant in May 2026, continued missile alert systems in Israel, and a major strike on the Iranian supreme leader's compound in Tehran on February 28, 2026 [^][^][^]. Negotiations for a temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz are ongoing between Iran and Oman, while the US pursues broader diplomatic efforts through intermediaries like Qatar and Pakistan, despite contradictory public statements regarding the existence of direct US-Iran talks [^][^][^].
Israeli national elections are scheduled for October 27, 2026, marking the end of the current Knesset's full four-year term [^] [^] [^] [^] . Key upcoming dates include September 9, 2026, for the submission of candidate lists, and October 20, 2026, for early voting at diplomatic missions [^][^][^][^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Closes: August 31, 2026
12. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: As of August 4, 2026, no stable ceasefire exists between Israel/US and Iran; previous agreements, including a mid-June memorandum, have repeatedly collapsed.
- Trigger: Tensions remain extremely high following an attack on a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz on August 4, 2026 [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: The Israel-Iran war of 2025, a 12-day conflict which began on June 13, 2025, concluded with a ceasefire agreement on June 24, 2025 [^] .
- Trigger: As of August 2026, this ceasefire is characterized as tenuous and volatile, with ongoing tensions marked by incidents such as a drone strike on a UAE nuclear power plant in May 2026, continued missile alert systems in Israel, and a major strike on the Iranian supreme leader's compound in Tehran on February 28, 2026 [^] [^] [^] .
14. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
