Russia Parliamentary Election: 2nd Place
Short Answer
Both the model and the market overwhelmingly agree that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is most likely to secure second place in the 2026 Russian Parliamentary Election, with only minor residual uncertainty following the Supreme Court's exclusion of the Yabloko party.
1. Executive Verdict
- Communist Party (KPRF) is widely favored for second place, holding a strong regional presence.
- New People appears to be gaining momentum as a "significant challenger" for runner-up.
- Yabloko is definitively excluded from elections following a Supreme Court ruling.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) | 81.0% | 79.0% | The Communist Party is the primary opposition, with strong regional support and consistent prediction market favorability. |
| Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) | 10.9% | 9.7% | The party struggles with brand identity and influence following its founder's death. |
| Yabloko | 0.2% | 0.0% | The Supreme Court finalized Yabloko's exclusion from the upcoming September 2026 elections on August 17, 2026. |
| New People (NL) | 7.5% | 10.3% | New People is reported to be gaining momentum as a significant challenger for runner-up, with competitive polling. |
| United Russia (ER) | 0.6% | 0.7% | United Russia is the ruling party and is universally expected to win the most seats. |
Current Context
The 2026 Russian parliamentary elections will proceed with 11 registered parties. Scheduled for September 18–20, 2026, voting will occur over three days for 450 State Duma seats [^][^][^]. The Supreme Court finalized the exclusion of the opposition Yabloko party on August 17, 2026, rejecting their final appeal [^][^][^][^][^].
Expert-curated databases do not track Russian national parliamentary elections. These sources primarily focus on U.S. election data, including local elections in U.S. towns named Russia or U.S. congressional districts [^][^][^][^]. While they contain historical references to investigations into Russian interference in U.S. elections, they do not provide forecasts for Russian national polls [^][^][^][^].
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
This market has traded sideways in a stable range since its inception. The probability for a United Russia second-place finish opened at 85.5% and has since fluctuated between a low of 76.5% and a high of 86.0%. The current price is 82.0%, indicating a high and persistent market expectation for this outcome. The most significant price movement in the provided data is a minor increase from 81.0% on August 11 to 82.0% on August 18. This small rise followed the August 17 report that Russia's Supreme Court rejected the final appeal from the opposition Yabloko party, finalizing its exclusion from the election.
The most salient feature of this market is the complete absence of trading volume. With zero contracts traded across 337 data points, the price chart does not reflect a consensus formed through active participation. Instead, the price movement represents adjustments to an initial quote, likely from a single market maker. The lack of volume suggests there is no market conviction behind the high probability estimate. The price levels of 76.5% and 86.0% have acted as informal support and resistance, but these boundaries have not been tested by any trading activity.
The chart indicates a static sentiment. The consistently high probability suggests an initial assessment that the specified outcome is very likely. However, without any trading volume, it is impossible to gauge the depth of this belief or how it would react to new information. The price action is not a product of dynamic price discovery among traders.
3. Significant Price Movements
Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.
📉 August 07, 2026: 23.0pp drop
Price decreased from 25.0% to 2.0%
Outcome: Yabloko
What happened: The 23.0 percentage point drop for "Yabloko" on August 07, 2026, was primarily driven by market anticipation of its imminent disqualification from the Russian parliamentary election [^][^][^][^][^]. Although the party was officially removed from the ballot by the Supreme Court on August 10, 2026, following a lawsuit, the market appears to have priced in this outcome days earlier [^][^]. Yabloko's rapid surge in support, heavily fueled by social media engagement with Telegram subscriber counts nearly doubling in early August 2026, made it a target for removal by authorities [^][^][^][^]. Therefore, social media was a contributing accelerant, as its role in boosting Yabloko's visibility and support directly triggered the authorities' intervention that the market reacted to.
4. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
Here's a summary of the contract rules:
1. YES resolution trigger: A "Yes" resolution occurs if the named political party wins the second greatest number of seats in the next Russian State Duma election. This includes seats won by any coalitions the party represents, with specific rules for attributing collective seats if multiple listed parties form an alliance. 2. NO resolution trigger: A "No" resolution occurs if the named political party does not secure the second greatest number of seats in the Russian State Duma election. This means another party or coalition finishes in the second position according to the ranking rules. 3. Key dates/deadlines: The Russian parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 2026. If the definitive results are not known by September 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET, the market will resolve to "Other." 4. Special settlement conditions: Parties are primarily ranked by the number of seats won. Ties in seats are broken first by the total number of valid votes received, then by alphabetical order of party abbreviations if ties persist. Resolution will be based on a consensus of credible reporting, deferring to official Russian government sources, such as the Central Election Commission, in cases of ambiguity.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) | $0.83 | $0.19 | 81% |
| Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) | $0.12 | $0.92 | 11% |
| New People (NL) | $0.07 | $0.93 | 8% |
| United Russia (ER) | $0.01 | $1.00 | 1% |
| Yabloko | $0.01 | $1.00 | 0% |
| A Just Russia – For Truth (SRZP) | $0.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Civic Platform (GP) | $0.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Rodina | $0.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Other | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party B | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party C | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party D | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party E | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party F | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party G | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party H | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party I | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party J | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party K | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party L | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party M | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party N | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party O | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party P | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party Q | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party R | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party S | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party T | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party U | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party V | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party W | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party X | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party Y | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Party Z | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
Market Discussion
Traders overwhelmingly predict the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) will secure second place in the 2026 Russian Parliamentary Election, with an 82% implied probability. This consensus stems from KPRF's strong regional structures, established voter base among systemic opposition parties, and historical patterns of opposition consolidation. While the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and New People (NL) show fluctuating poll numbers, KPRF's organizational edge and consistent performance suggest that only significant late-campaign developments or turnout variations are likely to alter the current rankings.
5. Trader Dashboard
A deterministic, per-market integrity scorecard computed from order-book and price data. Higher is better for Trader Trust, Liquidity, Move Quality and Resolution; higher means more risk for Quote Risk and Avoid Risk.
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)PrimaryTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
United Russia (ER)Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
A Just Russia – For Truth (SRZP)Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
New People (NL)Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
RodinaTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Civic Platform (GP)Trader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
OtherTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
YablokoTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Party BTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Party CTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party DTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party ETrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party FTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party GTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party HTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party ITrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party JTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party KTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party LTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party MTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party NTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party OTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party PTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party QTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party RTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party STrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party TTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party UTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party VTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party WTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party XTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party YTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Party ZTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
trader_dashboard_lean_v1.13 · computed Aug 18, 2026
6. What historical results and recent polling data underpin the Communist Party's (KPRF) status as the front-runner for second place in the 2026 Duma election?
| KPRF Probability for Second Place (2026) | 35% to 84% (as of August 2026) [^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| KPRF Historical Role | Primary opposition party since the 1990s [^][^][^][^] |
| Key Competitors for Second Place | Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and New People (NL) [^][^] |
Prediction markets strongly position the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) as the leading contender for second place in the upcoming 2026 State Duma election. As of August 2026, various prediction platforms indicate market-implied probabilities for the KPRF securing this outcome, with estimates ranging significantly from 35% to 84% [^][^][^][^].
The KPRF's historical role underpins its current front-runner status. This position is largely attributed to its consistent presence as the primary opposition party since the 1990s and its established regional strength. These historical advantages have persisted despite ongoing governmental pressure and the strategic deployment of 'spoiler' parties in past elections, which aimed to fragment its vote share [^][^][^][^].
Despite its historical strengths, the KPRF faces substantial competition for second place. Other significant political entities, including the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and New People (NL), are also strong contenders. Current polling data suggests that the race among these parties for the second position will be tight and highly competitive [^][^].
7. How do the political platforms and regional strongholds of the KPRF, LDPR, and SRZP compare ahead of the September 2026 elections?
| KPRF & LDPR 2026 Polling | High single digits to low double digits [^][^] |
|---|---|
| KPRF 2nd Place Probability | 66-84% for September 2026 elections (August 2026 prediction markets) [^][^] |
| KPRF Regional Support | Industrial centers, large cities, Far East, Siberia [^][^] |
Russia's systemic opposition parties have distinct platforms and regional strongholds. Ahead of the September 2026 elections, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) advocates for 'renewed socialism' rooted in Marxism–Leninism, while the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is recognized for its nationalist and populist rhetoric [^][^][^]. These parties, along with A Just Russia—For Truth (SRZP), are categorized as systemic opposition, meaning they generally support government policies and the ruling United Russia party despite occasional rhetorical opposition [^][^]. The specific political platform and regional strongholds of the SRZP are not detailed in the available research [^][^].
Polling indicates KPRF and LDPR trail United Russia ahead of 2026. Current opinion polling for the September 2026 elections consistently shows both the KPRF and LDPR polling in the high single digits to low double digits, significantly trailing the ruling United Russia party [^][^]. The KPRF maintains strong support in industrial centers, large cities, and parts of the Far East and Siberia [^][^]. The LDPR, conversely, remains a competitive force in various regions, though it encounters challenges in national republics [^].
Prediction markets favor KPRF for second place in the 2026 elections. As of August 2026, prediction markets overwhelmingly favor the KPRF to secure second place in the upcoming elections. Estimates indicate a 66-84% probability for the KPRF to achieve this outcome compared to other systemic opposition parties [^][^].
8. What potential Kremlin interventions or opposition crackdowns before September 2026 could disrupt the expected second-place finish for the KPRF?
| Election Target Date | September 2026 (parliamentary election) [^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| KPRF Polling Trend | Declining [^][^][^][^] |
| Challenger Party Momentum | New People gaining momentum [^][^][^][^] |
The Kremlin aims to prevent the KPRF from securing second place. The Kremlin is actively seeking to disrupt the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's (KPRF) anticipated second-place finish in the September 2026 parliamentary election, employing strategies of structural manipulation and systemic crackdowns [^][^][^][^][^][^][^]. While prediction markets have historically favored the KPRF, recent polling and expert analysis suggest a decline in the party's support [^][^][^][^]. Concurrently, the New People party is gaining momentum, positioning itself as a significant challenger for the runner-up spot in the upcoming election [^][^][^][^].
Structural manipulation tactics are key to Kremlin electoral interference. To achieve its desired electoral results, the Kremlin actively utilizes structural manipulation tactics. These include redistricting to benefit loyalist candidates, deploying "spoiler" parties to fragment opposition votes, and leveraging administrative resources to disenfranchise non-compliant candidates [^][^][^][^][^]. To specifically undermine the KPRF's anticipated second-place standing, the Kremlin is likely encouraging strategic support for alternative "systemic opposition" parties such as New People, while also manipulating the electoral narrative to frame the KPRF as an obsolete and ineffective political force [^][^][^].
Systemic crackdowns further suppress genuine opposition before 2026. In addition to structural manipulation, systemic crackdown measures are expected ahead of the September 2026 vote. These include the complete exclusion of genuine opposition voices, exemplified by the Yabloko party being subjected to court-ordered ballot bans [^][^][^]. Furthermore, key political figures are being imprisoned under anti-war and extremism legislation, which serves to suppress dissent and consolidate power [^][^][^][^].
9. Which are the most credible sources for Russian domestic election polling, and how has their accuracy fared for parties like the KPRF and LDPR in past Duma elections?
| Dominant Russian pollsters | VTsIOM, FOM, and Levada Center (formerly independent) [^] |
|---|---|
| Polling reliability challenges | Wartime censorship, self-censorship, low response rates, preference falsification [^][^][^][^] |
| 2026 Duma 2nd place race | Highly competitive between KPRF, LDPR, and New People [^][^] |
Russian election polling faces severe reliability challenges. State-affiliated organizations such as VTsIOM and FOM, alongside the formerly independent Levada Center, primarily conduct opinion polling in Russia, but their reliability is significantly compromised [^]. Their accuracy is diminished by factors including wartime censorship, high levels of self-censorship among respondents, low response rates, and the potential for preference falsification, making them less dependable compared to historical benchmarks [^][^][^][^].
Historical polling accuracy for major parties has been significantly hindered. The ability to accurately assess party-list shares for the Communist Party (KPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) has been hampered by methodological issues and a systemic environment where electoral outcomes are susceptible to administrative influence or fraud [^][^]. Furthermore, statistical election forensics research frequently uncovers discrepancies in official Russian election results, indicating deviations from expected patterns in past Duma elections, such as those in 2003, 2011, and 2016 [^].
The 2026 Duma election’s second-place race is highly competitive. For the upcoming 2026 Duma elections, the contest for second place, a position traditionally occupied by the KPRF, is anticipated to be extremely close [^][^]. The LDPR and the 'New People' party are currently polling in close contention with the KPRF for this spot [^][^].
10. What challenges have the LDPR and SRZP faced since the 2021 election that inhibit their ability to overtake the KPRF for second place in 2026?
| KPRF Electoral Standing | Primary parliamentary opposition, polling ahead of LDPR and SRZP [^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| LDPR Post-Zhirinovsky Challenge | Struggling with brand identity and political influence [^][^] |
| SRZP Brand Weakness | Weak, ill-defined political brand and failure to convert media exposure into electoral growth [^][^] |
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) consistently maintains its strong position as the primary parliamentary opposition. Since the 2021 election, the KPRF has consistently held its status, leading both the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and A Just Russia – For Truth (SRZP) in polls. Prediction markets also heavily favor the KPRF to retain second place in the 2026 election, highlighting the significant hurdles for its rivals [^][^][^].
Both the LDPR and SRZP struggle with brand identity and political influence. Following the death of its founder, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the LDPR has faced difficulty maintaining its distinct brand and competing effectively with the KPRF's established presence [^][^]. Similarly, A Just Russia – For Truth (SRZP) suffers from a weak and poorly defined political brand. Despite receiving significant state-sanctioned media exposure and attempting to project itself as a nationalist and social-democratic alternative, SRZP has not achieved electoral growth [^][^].
A restrictive electoral environment limits opposition growth, solidifying KPRF's lead. The Russian electoral system is characterized by extensive state management, administrative resources, and media control, primarily benefiting the ruling United Russia party [^][^]. This highly controlled environment inherently constrains the potential for any systemic opposition party, including the KPRF, to achieve substantial growth or challenge the existing parliamentary hierarchy. Consequently, this restrictive framework inadvertently reinforces the KPRF's consistent lead over its rivals [^][^][^][^].
11. What Could Change the Odds
Conflicting Election Catalysts
Russia's 2026 parliamentary elections for the State Duma are scheduled from September 18 to September 20, 2026 [^] [^] [^] [^] . This Is What You Need to Know. - The Moscow Times" data-source-lanes="traditional">[^]. Prediction markets for "Russia Parliamentary Election: 2nd Place" actively trade, with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) consistently favored to secure the second-highest number of seats [^][^][^][^]. Key event catalysts include the August 22, 2026, party congress phase, the start of the three-day voting period on September 18, 2026, and the official final results announcement after the September 20, 2026, close of polls [^][^][^][^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Closes: September 20, 2026
12. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Russia's 2026 parliamentary elections for the State Duma are scheduled from September 18 to September 20, 2026 [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Prediction markets for "Russia Parliamentary Election: 2nd Place" actively trade, with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) consistently favored to secure the second-highest number of seats [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Key event catalysts include the August 22, 2026, party congress phase, the start of the three-day voting period on September 18, 2026, and the official final results announcement after the September 20, 2026, close of polls [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: However, research also indicates there is no scheduled Russian parliamentary election in 2026 [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] .
14. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
