Short Answer

An invasion of Taiwan by China by the end of 2026 is not expected to occur, with the market pricing this outcome at 3.8%.

1. Market Behavior & Drivers

This market shows no trading volume. The perceived probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by the end of 2026 has remained in a narrow, sideways band between 3.6% and 4.3%. This stability reflects a broad expert and intelligence consensus, cited in September 2026, that such an event is highly unlikely.
The complete absence of trading activity is the market's defining characteristic. Minor price fluctuations are nominal adjustments, not reactions to new information or shifts in sentiment. U.S. intelligence reporting from March 2026, which indicated Chinese leaders lacked invasion plans for 2027, reinforces the low-probability baseline that has priced this market from its inception. No catalyst has emerged to challenge this view.
  • Since last update (~28d): "Yes" outcome probability for China invading Taiwan by 2026 decreased 0.1pp, model tracking market.
  • The model's edge remained at 0.0pp, showing no divergence from market pricing.
  • Confidence score stayed constant at 5.0, indicating no change in assessment reliability.
  • No invasion by 2026: PLA lacks full-scale amphibious assault capability for Taiwan.
  • No invasion by 2026: Analysts see no active preparation or immediate intent.
  • Yes by 2026: Taiwan's formal independence declaration is the main invasion trigger.

Who Wins and Why

Outcome Market Model Why
Yes 3.8% 3.8% China's persistent territorial claims over Taiwan and increasing military assertiveness raise invasion prospects.

Current Context

Expert and market consensus indicates a low invasion probability by 2026. As of September 2026, a broad expert and intelligence consensus judges a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by year-end 2026 as highly unlikely [1][2][3][4]. U.S. intelligence agencies reported in March 2026 that Chinese leaders currently lack plans for a 2027 invasion and do not maintain a fixed timeline for unification [1][2][5]. Prediction markets, including Polymarket, price the probability of an invasion by end-2026 between 1% and 4% [2][6][4][7], consistent with low probabilities observed in late 2025 [8]. While U.S. intelligence and military officials acknowledge a People's Liberation Army (PLA) goal to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027, this is seen as a capability milestone, not an indicator of invasion intent by that date [9][10]. Mid-2026 public opinion data shows only about 25% of Americans believe a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is likely [11][12]. Expert commentary in 2026 emphasizes deterrence complexity, but does not frame an imminent invasion as a base-case scenario [13].
China lacks assault capacity and exhibits no large-scale invasion preparations. Beijing currently lacks the necessary amphibious assault capacity for a full-scale invasion [2][6][4][5][14][15]. There are no observable signs of the large-scale military mobilization, such as sealift assembly or reserve call-ups, required for such an operation [2][6][4][5][14][15]. China continues to engage in gray-zone coercion, including daily air and maritime patrols, but analysts differentiate this from full-scale invasion precursors [2][6][4][5][14][15]. Tensions remain elevated, with China issuing warnings of "consequences" as of September 1, 2026, regarding Taiwan's participation in regional gatherings like the Pacific Islands Forum [16][17][18]. These warnings are interpreted as diplomatic and coercive pressure rather than a precursor to immediate kinetic invasion [16][17][18].
Sources (18)
  1. 1US intelligence agencies not expecting China to invade...aljazeera.com
  2. 2Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026?polymarket.com
  3. 3Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?defensepriorities.org
  4. 4Polymarket Taiwan invasion odds 2026: is 3.85¢ overpriced? - The Fair Stakethefairstake.com
  5. 5New report shows PLA prioritizing joint island-landing capabilities: Analyst - Focus Taiwanfocustaiwan.tw
  6. 6China invasion of Taiwan before end of 2026? — farexiofarexio.com
  7. 7China Invade Taiwan 2026 Odds & Analysis | Prediction Geniuspredictiongenius.io
  8. 8src/data/polymarket/predictions.csvgithub.com
  9. 9Taiwan: Defense and Military Issuescongress.gov
  10. 10EMERGING GLOBAL THREATS: PUTTING AMERICA'S...congress.gov
  11. 11Americans Dislike China, Waver on Whether To Help Taiwanrealclearpolling.com
  12. 12Trump Flexes Power, but Cracks Are Showingrealclearpolling.com
  13. 13The TACO trade meets the fog of war - by Nate Silvernatesilver.net
  14. 14Taiwan tracks 10 Chinese ships, 2 military helicopterstaiwannews.com.tw
  15. 15https://polymarket.com/event/will-china-invade-taiwan-by-september-30-2026/will-china-invade-taiwan-by-september-30-2026polymarket.com
  16. 16China warns of ‘consequences’ over Taiwan presence at Pacific Islands Forum | Pacific Islands Forum | The Guardiantheguardian.com
  17. 17Taiwan foreign minister decries Chinese 'bullying' at Pacific forum - Nikkei Asiaasia.nikkei.com
  18. 18China warns of 'consequences' over Taiwan's attendance at Pacific leaders meeting - CNAchannelnewsasia.com

2. Price Chart

Historical Price (Probability)

Outcome probability
Date

3. Market Data

Contract Snapshot

This market's rules are from Polymarket, not Kalshi.

The market resolves to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive to establish control over any inhabited portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, it resolves to "No." Resolution sources include official confirmation from China, Taiwan, the UN, or any UN Security Council permanent member, as well as a consensus of credible reporting.

Available Contracts

Market options and current pricing

Outcome bucket Yes (price) No (price) Last trade probability
Yes $0.04 $0.96 4%

Market Discussion

Traders on this market largely anticipate that China will not invade Taiwan by the end of 2026, with the market showing a low 4% probability. Arguments against an invasion emphasize China's current lack of full amphibious assault capacity, sustained "gray-zone" pressure without escalating to full conflict, Taiwan's bolstered defenses, consistent U.S. policy, and China's internal economic challenges. While unlikely, potential triggers for an invasion include military miscalculations, significant Taiwanese independence moves, sudden U.S.-China diplomatic ruptures, or accelerated PLA modernization breakthroughs.

4. Trust Index

Octagon Trust Index Polymarket 56 Caution

Military/operational market: timing is known inside government before the public

Integrity risk· Information exposure

How it adds up
Integrity80% of score54Caution
Trade quality20% of score64Caution

Includes the cost to trade: a $10,000 order can't be filled here because the order book is too thin.

Trust score56Caution

Weighted blend with hard caps — a critically weak safety pillar, or a severe trading anomaly, caps the total regardless of the rest. Full methodology · About the Trust Index

Trust profile
Integrity5 screens run · 3 don't apply · 2 awaiting data
Market integrity
74Good

Outcome is hard to influence

Outcome controlStructural risk · high confidence

Settlement is decided by a token-holder vote.

Screened clean
Large tradesNo single trade dominates the tape. Clear
Thin-volume movesNo significant move Clear
Size patternsNo distribution read Clear
1 screen not run
Thin-leg conviction · doesn't apply to this market type
Info fairness
30High Risk
Information exposureStructural risk · medium confidence

Military/operational market: timing is known inside government before the public

4 screens not run
Move vs. catalyst · data source not connected
Longshot repricing · doesn't apply to this market type
Pre-broadcast certainty · doesn't apply to this market type
Cross-venue timing · data source not connected
Resolution quality
60Caution

Settlement depends on token voting

No suspicious activity on any screen

Resolution rules read: Clear

Settlement is decided by a token-holder vote.

Liquidity
82Deep

Size fills near the screen price

1 contract

Yes82
Deep · low confidence

Light recent trading — size may not fill near the screen price.

Move quality
70Stable

No significant moves

1 contract

Yes—
No significant move (6h)

Price was stable over the last 6 hours.

Rule clarity
100Clear

Counts toward Resolution quality, not here

1 contract

Yes100
Clear · high confidence

All checks pass

objective outcome · Clearofficial source · Cleartime boundary · Clear
Trade quality
64Caution

Order book is thin

Tradable, but expect execution cost beyond small sizes.

Outcome quality 82 (notional-weighted)

$100 order: 0.3c slippage (~15% of a 2c contract)

$1,000 order: 0.9c slippage (~45% of a 2c contract)

$10,000 order: book too thin to fill

Yes82Market scoreLiquidity82Move quality–Rule clarity100
Why 82
Liquidity
82 · Deep · low confidence

Light recent trading — size may not fill near the screen price.

Move quality
No significant move (6h)

Price was stable over the last 6 hours.

Rule clarity
100 · Clear · high confidence

All checks pass

objective outcome · Clearofficial source · Cleartime boundary · Clear

underwriting_v1.4 · computed Oct 2, 2026

5. What specific diplomatic or military events involving Taiwan or the United States could serve as a potential casus belli for a Chinese invasion before the end of 2026?

Most Significant TriggerFormal declaration of independence by Taiwan [1][2]
US-Taiwan Policy TriggerU.S.-Taiwan diplomatic or military actions abandoning the 'One China' policy [3][2]
Other Potential CatalystsMilitary miscalculations, maritime quarantine/blockade, or perceived window of opportunity from shifting military parity [4][3][5]
Taiwan's formal independence declaration is the main invasion trigger. A formal declaration of independence by Taiwan before the end of 2026 is widely identified as the most significant casus belli for a Chinese invasion. Such an act would compel Beijing to respond, irrespective of its operational readiness [1][2].
US-Taiwan actions challenging 'One China' could also trigger invasion. Beyond an independence declaration, potential triggers include U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic or military actions that Beijing might perceive as abandoning the 'One China' policy. These provocations, such as significant changes in arms sales or high-level visits, could necessitate a preemptive or forceful response from Beijing [3][2].
Military incidents or strategic shifts might escalate cross-strait tensions. Additional catalysts for escalation, moving beyond current gray-zone coercion, involve military miscalculations during routine exercises. Furthermore, implementing a maritime quarantine or blockade, or a perceived window of opportunity created by shifting military parity, could also serve as factors leading to conflict [4][3][5].
Sources (5)
  1. 1Target Taiwan: One China and cross-strait stabilitydefensepriorities.org
  2. 2$14M Is Betting on Whether China Invades Taiwan by 2026. | Cointrenchescointrenches.io
  3. 3Xi Said the Quiet Part: Taiwan 'Could Trigger Conflict' | The Arc of Powerthearcofpower.com
  4. 4China's Grey-Zone and Geoeconomic Coercion Below the...rusi.org
  5. 5Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026 Odds & Prediction Market Analysis | CryptoSlatecryptoslate.com

6. What key military and logistical indicators do defense analysts monitor to validate the consensus that China is not actively preparing for a 2026 invasion?

US Intelligence Assessment (2026)No plan for 2027 invasion, no fixed timeline for unification (March 2026 [1][2][3])
Logistical SignaturesAbsence of key indicators like ferry requisition, massing hospitals, reserve mobilization, port closures, PRC national withdrawal [4][5][6][2]
PLA Military ActivityCoercive 'gray-zone' signaling, lacking invasion-level staging or logistic build-ups [7][8][9][2][10]
Defense analysts generally agree China is not preparing for a 2026 invasion. This consensus is substantially shaped by the U.S. Intelligence Community's 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, released in March 2026. The assessment explicitly states that Chinese leaders do not currently plan a 2027 invasion of Taiwan and do not possess a fixed timeline for unification, serving as a primary basis for this prevailing view [1][2][3].
Key logistical signatures for an invasion remain notably absent. A critical factor validating the assessment is the continued absence of specific indicators that would typically precede an invasion. These include the requisitioning of civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries, the massing of field hospitals and blood bank supplies, the mobilization of reserve military units, the closure of regional ports (especially in Fujian), and the systematic withdrawal of PRC nationals from exposed regions [4][5][6][2].
Current PLA activities are coercive, not indicative of invasion preparation. Military actions by the PLA, such as ADIZ incursions and exercises like 'Strait Thunder,' are interpreted as coercive 'gray-zone' signaling rather than combat-preparatory maneuvers. These exercises consistently lack the large-scale amphibious staging, naval concentration, and logistical build-ups necessary for a full-scale invasion [7][8][9][2][10]. Furthermore, other indicators, such as the 2026 purge of high-ranking Central Military Commission officers and the lack of domestic public mobilization or economic war-preparedness measures, also suggest an absence of intent for high-intensity kinetic conflict [11][2].
Sources (11)
  1. 1China Not Committed to 2027 Taiwan Invasion, U.S. Intel...news.usni.org
  2. 2Polymarket Taiwan invasion odds 2026: is 3.85¢ overpriced? - The Fair Stakethefairstake.com
  3. 3Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026? | Leverage up to 5x Odds & Analysispredmart.com
  4. 4The Taiwan scenarios 2: Warning signsaspistrategist.org.au
  5. 5How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade...carnegieendowment.org
  6. 6Economic Indicators of Chinese Military Action against...csis.org
  7. 7China Is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landingscimsec.org
  8. 8China likely to continue to prioritise intimidation against...janes.com
  9. 9China & Taiwan Update, March 6, 2026understandingwar.org
  10. 10https://polymarket.com/event/will-china-invade-taiwan-before-2027polymarket.com
  11. 11Xi Jinping's Taiwan Dashboardmedia.defense.gov

7. How do Western intelligence assessments of the PLA's 2027 invasion 'capability' goal differ from the tactical readiness required for an actual invasion attempt in 2026?

PLA 2027 GoalModernization benchmark for invasion capability, not an inevitable attack date [1][2][3]
2026 Tactical ReadinessIncomplete due to internal factors (command turmoil, reforms, training) [1][2][3]
2026 Invasion Probability3.8%-4% (Polymarket as of Sept 1, 2026) [4][5][6]
Western intelligence differentiates the PLA's 2027 capability goal from invasion intent. Western intelligence distinguishes the PLA's 2027 invasion 'capability' goal as a modernization benchmark, separate from the tactical readiness required for an actual invasion attempt. This 2027 goal pertains to the PLA's ability to conduct an invasion, not an inevitable date for an attack. Chinese leaders do not currently plan an invasion in 2027 nor have a fixed timeline for unification, clearly separating the 'capability' benchmark from an intent to invade [1][2][3].
Tactical readiness for a 2026 invasion is considered incomplete. Conversely, tactical readiness for an actual invasion in 2026 is viewed as incomplete due to factors such as ongoing command turmoil, internal military reforms, and insufficient joint training models [1][2][3]. Analysts point to a decline in PLA air activity, disruptions from recent senior leadership purges, and the absence of visible large-scale military mobilization, such as ferry requisitions or reserve call-ups, as indicators against a 2026 invasion [1][7][5]. Furthermore, as of September 1, 2026, prediction markets indicate a very low consensus probability for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by the end of 2026, with the market-implied probability hovering around 3.8%–4% [4][5][6].
Sources (7)
  1. 1US intelligence agencies not expecting China to invade...aljazeera.com
  2. 2China Not Committed to 2027 Taiwan Invasion, U.S. Intel...news.usni.org
  3. 3Where There Is No Will, There Is No Way: A Prognosis For...icds.ee
  4. 4Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026?polymarket.com
  5. 5Polymarket Taiwan invasion odds 2026: is 3.85¢ overpriced? - The Fair Stakethefairstake.com
  6. 6Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026? — 3.9% YES | PolyInsiderpolyinsider.io
  7. 7China & Taiwan Update, March 6, 2026understandingwar.org

8. What open-source intelligence (OSINT) and commercial satellite sources are available for monitoring PLA force posture opposite Taiwan through 2026?

Primary monitoring sources"blue OSINT" and commercial satellites [1][2]
Source availabilitythrough 2026 [1][2]
Key observable indicatorlack of observable mass amphibious buildup [3][4][5]
Monitoring the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) force posture opposite Taiwan relies significantly on non-governmental open-source intelligence (blue OSINT) and commercial satellite sources, which remain available through 2026 [1][2][6]. These critical resources provide insights into military deployments and movements in the region.
Diverse OSINT methods track China's military, including satellite imagery and public contributions. "Blue OSINT" encompasses various methods for tracking China's military, including commercial satellite imagery providers such as Planet Labs, ship-tracking data from AIS, and specialized social media "ship-spotting" accounts [1][2][6]. Beyond these commercial providers, independent researchers analyze official state media footage, and young Taiwanese actively contribute to monitoring efforts using open-source intelligence [1][7]. This broad range of public and commercial data enhances transparency regarding military activities.
Current assessments indicate low invasion risk, citing no observable amphibious buildup. Insights derived from these diverse monitoring sources inform current assessments, which show a low probability of a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan by the end of 2026 [3][4][5]. This assessment is largely attributed to the absence of any observable mass amphibious buildup, which would be a prerequisite for such a large-scale military operation [3][4][5]. The lack of evidence for such preparations, as revealed by OSINT and commercial satellite data, strengthens this outlook.
Sources (7)
  1. 1The strategic advantages of blue OSINT, ubiquitous sensor...atlanticcouncil.org
  2. 2SITREP Chinese Military and Intelligence: July 11, 2026 to July 18, 2026 - Ronin's Gripsblog.roninsgrips.com
  3. 3Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026?polymarket.com
  4. 4Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026? Trading Odds & Predictions | Polymarketpolymarket.com
  5. 5Polymarket Taiwan invasion odds 2026: is 3.85¢ overpriced? - The Fair Stakethefairstake.com
  6. 6Planet Labs: Satellite Imagery & Earth Data Analyticsplanet.com
  7. 7Young Taiwanese track China's military using open-source...www3.nhk.or.jp

9. How does the People's Liberation Army's current amphibious assault capability compare to the force level required for a successful full-scale invasion of Taiwan?

PLA Invasion Capability Assessment DateLacking sufficient amphibious, logistical, and joint operations capability as of September 1, 2026 [1][2][3]
Probability of Taiwan invasion by 2026Approximately 4% [2][3][4][5]
PLA Modernization FocusExpanding lift and sustainment capabilities for future cross-Strait operations [1][6][7][8]
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) currently lacks full-scale invasion capability for Taiwan. As of September 1, 2026, the PLA is widely assessed to lack the necessary amphibious assault, logistical, and joint operations capability to successfully execute a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. This indicates that its current force levels are insufficient for an operation of such unprecedented scale in modern military history [1][2][3].
Modernization efforts and gray-zone activities are insufficient for invasion. Despite ongoing PLA modernization efforts, including the development of Type 075 LHDs, Type 076 drone carriers, and the integration of civilian RO-RO ferries and mobile pier systems, these advancements aimed at expanding lift and sustainment are not yet considered sufficient for a high-confidence invasion [1][6][7][8]. Beijing's aggressive gray-zone activities, which involve persistent maritime and air incursions, are primarily interpreted as sovereignty-assertion efforts rather than immediate preparations for a full-scale amphibious assault, which would necessitate observable, large-scale logistical mobilization [9][8][10][11].
Prediction markets corroborate low probability of imminent Taiwan invasion. This assessment is further corroborated by prediction markets, such as Polymarket, which maintain a very low probability, approximately 4%, for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by the end of 2026 [2][3][4][5]. This reflects a strong consensus that a large-scale military offensive is unlikely in the immediate future.
Sources (11)
  1. 1The Narrow Sea: Why a Taiwan Invasion Fleet's Real...defense.info
  2. 2$14M Is Betting on Whether China Invades Taiwan by 2026. | Cointrenchescointrenches.io
  3. 3Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026?polymarket.com
  4. 4Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026? Odds — Live Polymarket Probability & Chart (August 2026) | GeoOddsgeoodds.com
  5. 5Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026? Prediction Market & Oddsalph.ai
  6. 6China's Mobile Piers For Cross-Strait Operations Showcase...oe.t2com.army.mil
  7. 7China & Taiwan Update, February 13, 2026understandingwar.org
  8. 8China & Taiwan Update, August 14, 2026aei.org
  9. 9Confrontation Over Taiwan | Global Conflict Trackercfr.org
  10. 10REPORT: The Fragile Stability of Cross-Taiwan Strait...ncafp.org
  11. 11https://polymarket.copilot.markets/event/will-china-invade-taiwan-by-september-30-2026polymarket.copilot.markets

10. What Could Change the Odds

Key Catalysts

Prediction markets consistently price the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before December 31, 2026, at very low levels, typically in the low single-digit percentage range, such as ~3-4% [1][2][3][4][5]. U.S. intelligence assessments and expert consensus indicate China currently lacks the necessary amphibious assault and joint command capabilities for a successful full-scale invasion, with many analysts projecting full operational readiness for such an endeavor in the 2030–2035 timeframe [6][7][8][9]. U.S. officials have stated that a PRC invasion of Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable, noting that while Xi Jinping instructed the PLA to be ready to conduct a successful invasion by 2027, this represents a capability milestone rather than a confirmed intent to invade by that date or any specific year [10][11]. Observed military indicators, including PLA aircraft sortie rates and the impacts of recent high-level military purges on command stability, currently show no signs of the large-scale logistical and troop mobilization that would be required to precede an invasion attempt [1][7][8].
While an immediate full-scale invasion is considered unlikely, experts and intelligence reports emphasize that China remains committed to unification [6][12][7][8]. Risks persist regarding non-kinetic "gray-zone" escalation, such as a potential maritime quarantine or accidental military clash during exercises, which could create acute geopolitical crises short of a full invasion [6][12][7][8]. The near-term probability of an amphibious invasion remains low to moderate (e.g., 0.10–0.20 through 2027), while the risk of continued gray-zone coercion and escalation remains high [13][14]. PRC coercive tactics, including military exercises, cyberattacks, and economic pressure, have intensified, but have paradoxically hardened public opinion on Taiwan against unification and increased international willingness to support Taiwan [14].

Key Dates & Catalysts

  • Closes: December 31, 2026
Sources (14)
  1. 1Polymarket Taiwan invasion odds 2026: is 3.85¢ overpriced? - The Fair Stakethefairstake.com
  2. 2https://polymarket.com/event/will-china-invade-taiwan-before-2027polymarket.com
  3. 3China invasion of Taiwan before end of 2026? — farexiofarexio.com
  4. 4Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026? Trading Odds & Predictions | Polymarketpolymarket.com
  5. 5Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026? | Paritypredictparity.com
  6. 6A Perfect Storm for Taiwan in 2026? | Foreign Affairsforeignaffairs.com
  7. 7US intelligence agencies not expecting China to invade...aljazeera.com
  8. 8Where There Is No Will, There Is No Way: A Prognosis For...icds.ee
  9. 9Taiwan expert: China's military invasion capability to be complete by 2030–2035 - The Herald Businessbiz.heraldcorp.com
  10. 10Taiwan: Defense and Military Issuescongress.gov
  11. 11Taiwan: Defense and Military Issuescongress.gov
  12. 12Taiwan 2026 Geopolitical Risk Assessment: The Quarantine Window | CES Intelligenceces-intelligence.com
  13. 13analysis/syntheses/china-pla-purge-zhang-youxia-taiwan-synthesis.mdgithub.com
  14. 14Executive Summary. The PRC has vastly expanded the scope, scale, innovation, and integration of its use of coercive tactics against Taiwan, with purposes including the demoralization of the Taiwan people, to degrade the status quo that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades. Over the course of the last five years the PRC has significantly increased: 1) The scale of its military exercises around Taiwan and standing presence in and around the Strait; 2) Its doctrinal and technological approach to information warfare; and 3) Its integration of military, information, cyber, and economic coercion to coordinate multi-front pressure on the Taiwan government and people. Yet despite – and likely because of – this intensifying pressure, public opinion on Taiwan has hardened against the PRC, and other international partners are increasingly willing to support Taiwan publicly. As the PRC seeks to tie U.S. support to Taiwan to ongoing trade negotiations, American resolve and leadership from the Select Committee will be vital. Introduction. Chairman Moolenaar, Ranking Member Khanna, distinguished members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): thank you for including me in this important hearing today, at the beginning of a most consequential year for U.S.-China relations that will have a significant impact on Taiwan’s future. Since its inception, this committee has played a critical role in providing bipartisan oversight and in setting a bicameral legislative agenda that has meaningfully strengthened U.S. policy towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and in support of Taiwan. In particular, the Ten More for Taiwan document released by this committee in late 2025 provides an important set of findings and recommendations. At a time when this kind of work is too rare, the Select Committee has consistently demonstrated that vital American interests can be pursued with rigor and resolve in the face of growing threats from the PRC. As thecongress.gov