Will the US acquire any new territory?

No official U.S. economic or sovereignty package has been presented to Greenland. U.S. negotiators have not officially offered specific economic or sovereignty packages to Greenland's Naalakkakersuisut, including grants of rare earth mineral rights or direct financial transfers exceeding Denmark's annual block grant [Web Research Results]. The annual Danish block grant to Greenland is approximately 4.3-4.5 billion DKK, which translates to roughly $600-675 million [Web Research Results, 10]. Although internal U.S. discussions reportedly considered inducements such as per-person payments up to $100,000, potentially totaling around $6 billion, or a Compact of Free Association, these concepts were not officially proposed to the Naalakkakersuisut [Web Research Results, 3, 6]. Public reports have indicated discussions led by U.S. officials regarding a "framework" for U.S. access to rare earth minerals and "total access" to parts of Greenland for security purposes [Web Research Results, 4, 5]. Former President Trump publicly stated that rare earth mineral rights were part of his Greenland plan, but specific terms for such grants or lump-sum payments above the block grant have not been officially presented ^[1].

Greenlandic parties have not privately responded to specific U.S. offers. No sourced private responses from key members of the Siumut or Inuit Ataqatigiit parties regarding specific U.S. economic and sovereignty proposals have been found, consistent with the absence of official proposals [Web Research Results]. Publicly, these parties, along with the Naalakkakersuisut, led by Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen of Demokraatit, have consistently emphasized that sovereignty is considered a "red line" and firmly reject any compromise on this issue [Web Research Results]. While acknowledging that increased U.S. interest could potentially advance Greenland's path toward independence, their public statements focus on cooperation for access and security rather than any transfer of territory [Web Research Results].

No specific reports frame Greenland acquisition as a security imperative ^[1]. There is no evidence indicating that key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or House Foreign Affairs Committee are commissioning Congressional Research Service (CRS) or Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports specifically framing the acquisition of Greenland as a national security imperative to counter Chinese or Russian Arctic expansion [Web Research Results] ^[2]. While existing CRS reports address U.S ^[3]. security interests in Greenland and Arctic competition, these were not specifically commissioned by the committees for the explicit purpose of advocating for acquisition [Web Research Results, 1, 2, 3, 7] ^[4]. Broader congressional discussions acknowledge Greenland's strategic importance ^[5]. Despite the absence of targeted reports, Greenland's strategic importance and potential acquisition as a national security need are present in other congressional activities ^[6]. Some senators have emphasized Greenland's strategic value and resource potential in discussions [Web Research Results, 5] ^[7]. Additionally, legislative efforts like the "Greenland Annexation and Statehood Act" have proposed annexation to bolster U.S ^[1]. national security [Web Research Results, 6] ^[2]. However, these hearings and bills are not accompanied by specific CRS or GAO requests focused on framing acquisition as a security imperative [Web Research Results, 4] ^[3]. Legislative groundwork for Greenland acquisition appears limited ^[4]. The lack of specific CRS or GAO report commissions by key committee members, particularly those focused on framing acquisition as a national security imperative, suggests that strong legislative groundwork for the U.S ^[5]. to acquire new territory like Greenland by 2029 is not being laid [Web Research Results] ^[6]. This assessment is further supported by considerations such as potential opposition from Denmark and Greenland, and possible tensions with NATO allies [Web Research Results] ^[7].

The Trump administration did not formally threaten invoking Article XI. The administration did not formally threaten to invoke Article XI of the 1951 US-Denmark Greenland Defense Agreement. While former President Trump expressed interest in acquiring Greenland in 2019, an idea rejected by Danish and Greenlandic leaders, there is no evidence that this interest evolved into a formal threat to invoke Article XI ^[1]. Article XI itself outlines procedures for the removal of U.S. property upon the agreement's termination, requiring mutual consent for its conclusion rather than serving as a unilateral withdrawal clause for the United States ^[3].

Base agreement renewals were not linked to territorial concessions. The Trump administration also did not link the renewal of base agreements at Pituffik/Thule Air Base to specific, time-bound concessions on territorial sovereignty or expanded sovereign base areas. Despite the administration's efforts to push for expanded U.S. access or control over base areas, particularly at Pituffik Air Base, no sources indicate that the renewal of base agreements was formally tied to time-bound territorial concessions ^[2]. Denmark and Greenland consistently rejected any suggestions concerning sovereignty, establishing these as "red lines" during discussions ^[4]. Greenland's Premier Kim Kielsen explicitly stated that sovereignty would not be an issue for discussion in future talks regarding U.S. bases, rebuffing suggestions from the Trump administration ^[5].

The U.S. is not actively negotiating for Pacific Island atolls. There are no active U.S. State Department or Pentagon negotiations with financially distressed Pacific Island nations, such as Kiribati or Tuvalu, regarding ceding sovereign atolls for U.S. military use in exchange for climate resettlement programs or Compact of Free Association-style economic aid [Web Research Results]. While the U.S. maintains a robust presence in the Pacific, its focus is not on acquiring new territory from these nations. Past speculation regarding U.S. territory acquisition has primarily centered on Greenland, not new atolls in the Pacific [Web Research Results].

Instead, U.S. engagement prioritizes existing Compacts of Free Association (COFA). The U.S. prioritizes the renewal and expansion of existing COFA agreements with three sovereign nations: the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) [Web Research Results, 3, 5, 6, 7]. These foundational COFA agreements are central to the U.S.-Pacific Islands Partnership, providing substantial economic assistance, development programs, and access to U.S. defense capabilities. In return, the U.S. gains exclusive military access and strategic denial rights over vast areas of the Pacific, all without involving the transfer of sovereignty over territory [Web Research Results, 5, 6, 7].

Proposals for new COFAs are mainly academic discussions. Discussions regarding potential new Compacts of Free Association, such as with Kiribati, are primarily proposed by think tanks and academic institutions, rather than being active, government-to-government negotiations for the cession of territory ^[1]. Overall, current U.S. policy in the Pacific emphasizes partnership, economic aid, and defense cooperation through existing frameworks rather than territorial acquisition ^[2].

Key NATO allies publicly support Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland. Canada has consistently expressed strong solidarity with Greenland and Denmark regarding Greenland's future and sovereignty ^[1]. This alignment has been emphasized through diplomatic engagements, such as meetings between Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Greenland’s and Denmark’s Ministers for Foreign Affairs ^[3]. The United Kingdom has also explicitly backed Denmark, affirming that Greenland's future is a decision for Denmark and Greenland alone, not for the United States ^[2]. This position was reportedly communicated, with the then-US President responding to UK and broader European concerns regarding the acquisition of Greenland ^[4]. These statements reinforce a stance of solidarity with Denmark, rejecting any external claims to Greenland's territory.

No private diplomatic pressure on Denmark from these allies is evident. Research indicates no available sources suggesting that the private stances of Canada or the UK differ from their public affirmations of support for Denmark's sovereignty. Furthermore, no evidence suggests that Canadian, Norwegian, or UK ambassadors in Copenhagen are signaling anything other than solidarity with Denmark, or are privately pressuring Denmark to accommodate US strategic interests. Diplomatic intelligence has not revealed any such pressure from these allies [Web Research Results summary].

The United States has not acquired any new territory as of March 26, 2026 ^[1]. Despite this, former President Trump has proposed several potential acquisitions, including Greenland, regaining control of the Panama Canal, involvement in Gaza redevelopment, and the annexation of Canada as the 51st state ^[2]. However, none of these proposals have resulted in a transfer of sovereignty ^[3]. Prediction markets indicate low probabilities for such acquisitions, with Polymarket showing odds of 11-28% for Greenland's acquisition by 2026 or 2027, and PredictIt placing the likelihood of any Greenland land acquisition in 2026 at 14% ^[4]. A Kalshi market for similar events is currently open with a timeline extending to 2029 ^[5].