Short Answer

The tariff rate on Chinese imports on January 1, 2027, is expected to be 20% or above, reflecting Trump administration commitments to maintain new tariffs at or below this level, consistent with Treasury assessments of the trade truce. The market prices this outcome at 97.0%.

1. Market Behavior & Drivers

The market's most significant swing was an 88.0 percentage point drop on November 6, 2026, for which the provided research identifies no specific news trigger. That move was almost entirely reversed two days later. An 87.0 percentage point spike on November 8 reflected the pricing-in of a new 7.5% Section 301 'excess manufacturing capacity' tariff planned by the US.

Volatility was also high in late October, driven by conflicting policy signals. On October 29, a U.S.-China agreement to reduce tariffs on $60 billion in goods and extend a tariff truce prompted a 25.0 percentage point drop in the market. The next day, the price rebounded 25.0 points as a separate one-year pause on a 24% reciprocal tariff surcharge on Chinese imports was scheduled to expire. No reported development coincides with the 50.0 point spike on October 28.

The tariff rate appears around 20% on January 1, 2027.
This aligns with Trump administration commitments and Treasury Secretary assessments.
Evidence suggests new tariffs will remain at or below 20%.

Who Wins and Why

Outcome	Market	Model	Why
20% or above	97.0%	95.3%	Trump administration commitments and Treasury assessments indicate tariffs around 20%.
50% or above	66.0%	51.4%	Evidence strongly indicates the general import tariff rate will be at or below 20%.
30% or above	78.0%	65.5%	Evidence indicates the general import tariff rate will be at or below 20%.
15% or above	89.0%	95.3%	Trump administration commitments and Treasury assessments indicate tariffs around 20%.
10% or above	26.0%	95.3%	Trump administration commitments and Treasury assessments indicate tariffs around 20%.

Current Context

Prediction markets price high tariff rates for Chinese imports by 2027. As of November 2026, the Kalshi prediction market prices the tariff rate on Chinese imports on January 1, 2027, at 78% for 30% or above, 66% for 50% or above, 99% for 10% or above, and 6% for 100% or above ^[1]^[2]. The current effective US tariff rate on Chinese imports is approximately 37.5% as of October 2026 ^[3]. This rate combines a 12.5% Section 301 forced-labor tariff, which superseded the expired 10% Section 122 tariff on July 24, 2026, with Section 301 duties of up to 25% on covered goods ^[3]^[4]. The Supreme Court ruled on February 20, 2026, that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize tariff imposition, invalidating the mechanism behind the administration's broadest China-specific measures. The administration responded with a 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, effective February 24, 2026 ^[5]^[6]. The US average applied tariff rate on all imports is estimated at 11.8% in 2026, up from 1.5% in 2022, according to the Tax Foundation. China faced an effective US tariff rate of 33.9% as of January 2026, the highest among major American trading partners ^[7]^[5].

Several new and expiring tariff actions will impact the January 2027 rate. Section 232 timber and lumber tariffs on Chinese imports will increase effective January 1, 2027: upholstered furniture tariffs rise from 25% to 30%, and kitchen cabinets and vanities tariffs from 25% to 50%, while softwood lumber remains at 10% ^[8]. New Section 301 tariffs on Chinese semiconductors were announced December 23, 2025, starting at 0% and increasing on June 23, 2027, to a rate to be announced at least 30 days prior. These duties apply in addition to existing 50% Section 301 tariffs on Chinese semiconductors ^[9]^[10]^[11]. Section 301 forced-labor tariffs effective July 24, 2026, impose a 12.5% duty on imports from China and 59 other economies that USTR found do not adequately prohibit goods produced with forced labor. These tariffs do not stack with Section 232 tariffs ^[4]^[12]. The US-China trade truce, extended through January 10, 2027, following the September 24, 2026, Trump-Xi summit, suspends Section 301 port fees on Chinese vessels and other measures. The Political Group forecasts an 81% chance the truce is extended past January 10, 2027, or replaced by a broader deal ^[13]^[7].

Administration signals no rush to extend the China trade truce. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated in May 2026 that the US is "not in a rush" to extend the China trade truce ^[14]^[15]. He believes China will accept the restoration of prior US tariff rates through new Section 301 duties, as long as they do not increase further ^[14]^[15]. The prior deal reduced extra tariffs on Chinese goods to about 20%, in addition to approximately 25% on many Chinese industrial products ^[14]^[15]. Following the 2026 midterm elections, where Democrats swept both the House and Senate, greater congressional scrutiny of the administration's trade agenda is expected ^[16]^[17]. Despite this, no immediate change in US tariff policy is anticipated, as the administration retains broad authority to impose tariffs through Sections 301, 232, and other statutory mechanisms ^[16]^[17].

Sources (17)

2. Price Chart

Historical Price (Probability)

Outcome probability

Date

3. Significant Price Movements

Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.

Outcome: 20% or above

📈 November 08, 2026: 87.0pp spike

Price increased from 10.0% to 97.0%

What happened: The 87.0 percentage point spike on November 08, 2026, primarily reflects the market's definitive pricing-in of the US policy trajectory towards a 20% tariff rate on Chinese imports by January 1, 2027. This was driven by the US plan to impose a 7.5% Section 301 'excess manufacturing capacity' tariff, which, when combined with the existing 12.5% forced-labor tariff (effective July 24, 2026), brings the total to exactly 20% ^[1]^[2]. This rate was further cemented by China's Ministry of Commerce publicly confirming on July 27, 2026, that the United States had committed to capping replacement tariffs on Chinese goods at 20% ^[3]^[2]. There is no evidence of social media activity, new traditional news, or specific announcements on November 8, 2026, that would have singularly caused such a sharp spike, suggesting the movement represents the full internalization of these well-established policy decisions. Social media was irrelevant to this price movement.

📉 November 06, 2026: 88.0pp drop

Price decreased from 98.0% to 10.0%

What happened: The provided research does not identify any specific social media posts or traditional news announcements dated November 6, 2026, that directly triggered the 88.0 percentage point drop in the prediction market [1-14]. While a "social media catalyst related to Trump-Xi trade negotiations" was suggested as a possible trigger, details regarding who posted, what was said, or when were not available ^[4]. The steep decline in the "20% or above" outcome, bringing it from an implied 98% down to 10% on November 6, 2026, signals a sudden market belief that the tariff rate on Chinese imports would fall below the 20% baseline established by the extended US-China trade truce ^[5]^[6]^[7]^[8]^[9]. Therefore, social media activity, while suggested as a potential factor, cannot be confirmed as the primary driver due to a lack of specific evidence, and its role remains unquantified within the provided information.

📈 October 30, 2026: 25.0pp spike

Price increased from 73.0% to 98.0%

What happened: The primary driver of the price spike was the scheduled expiration of a one-year pause on a 24% reciprocal tariff surcharge on Chinese imports, which was set to resume on October 30, 2026 ^[10]. This surcharge had been paused since October 30, 2025, following the Busan summit between Trump and Xi ^[11]. The automatic resumption of this significant tariff would immediately increase the overall tariff rate on Chinese imports, directly correlating with the market's expectation for rates of "20% or above" ^[10]. Social media was irrelevant, as no related activity from key figures or viral narratives on that date is indicated in the available information.

Outcome: 50% or above

📈 November 05, 2026: 43.0pp spike

Price increased from 26.0% to 69.0%

What happened: The primary driver of the 43.0 percentage point spike in the '50% or above' outcome on November 5, 2026, was the impending expiration of the US-China trade truce, also known as the Kuala Lumpur Arrangement ^[8]^[12]^[13]. This trade truce is scheduled to terminate five days later, on November 10, 2026, at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time, significantly raising expectations for the imposition of new or higher general tariffs on Chinese imports ^[12]^[13]. Although the research notes a "social media catalyst" was likely ^[7], no specific social media posts from key figures or viral narratives are detailed in the provided sources. Therefore, the approaching policy deadline appears to be the primary driver, with social media acting as mostly noise or irrelevant in this specific context due to lack of explicit evidence.

📉 October 29, 2026: 54.0pp drop

Price decreased from 93.0% to 39.0%

What happened: The primary driver of the 54.0 percentage point drop was the official news of a U.S.-China tariff agreement announced on October 29, 2026. On this date, the U.S. and China agreed to reduce tariffs on $60 billion worth of goods and extended their tariff truce until January 10, 2027 ^[14]. As part of this October 2026 deal, the White House agreed to drop reciprocal tariffs on Chinese goods back to roughly 47%, a rate expected to remain in effect through that date ^[14]^[15]^[16]. This stabilization of tariffs below 50% directly caused the market's "50% or above" outcome to decline significantly. Social media was not identified as a primary driver based on the provided information.

Sources (16)

4. Market Data

Contract Snapshot

This Kalshi market resolves to "Yes" if the tariff rate on Chinese imports is 50% or above on January 1, 2027. Conversely, it resolves to "No" if the tariff rate is below 50% on that same date. The maximum payout date for this market is December 31, 2026, and no special settlement conditions are specified in the provided content.

Available Contracts

Market options and current pricing

Outcome bucket	Yes (price)	No (price)	Last trade probability
20% or above	$0.98	$0.91	97%
15% or above	$0.99	$0.92	89%
30% or above	$0.97	$0.93	78%
50% or above	$0.67	$0.75	66%
10% or above	$0.99	$0.13	26%
100% or above	$0.18	$0.98	6%

Market Discussion

Expectations for Chinese import tariffs by January 1, 2027, are varied; Kalshi prices a 78% probability of 30% or above and 66% for 50% or above ^[1], contrasting with a Strature market (sealed on October 3, 2026) that estimates only a 10% chance of a broad tariff increase by January 10, 2027, due to an extended truce ^[2]. This lower probability aligns with a February 2026 Supreme Court ruling that reduced effective U.S. tariff rates to around 10% ^[3], and Polymarket traders assigning an 89% probability to a formal US-China tariff agreement being reached by December 31, 2026 ^[4], despite former President Trump's historical pattern of announcing aggressive tariffs and dismissing adverse rulings ^[5].

Sources (5)

5. Trust Index

Order book is critically thin.

Primary risk· Trade quality

How it adds up

Integrity80% of score78Good

Market integrity is low (67), but Integrity averages all three scores, so the other two pull it up. Only a critically low score would cap the total.

Trade quality20% of score24Avoid

Includes the cost to trade: a $100 order can't be filled here because the order book is too thin.

Trust score67Caution

Weighted blend with hard caps — a critically weak safety pillar, or a severe trading anomaly, caps the total regardless of the rest. Full methodology · About the Trust Index

Trust profile

Integrity4 screens run · 6 don't apply

6. What potential diplomatic or economic events could cause the US-China trade truce to be altered before its January 10, 2027 expiration?

Trade Truce Expiration	January 10, 2027 ^[1]
New US Tariff Expectation	After November 2026 midterms ^[2]^[3]
Trump Admin Tariff Levy	12.5% (February 2026) ^[4]

The US-China trade truce, expiring January 10, 2027, faces potential alterations. This could stem from China's actions regarding rare earth exports or new tariff implementations by the United States ^[1]^[5]^[2]^[3]^[6]. Logistical issues may also contribute to changes, such as the expiration date coinciding with the pre-Chinese New Year shipping rush and the potential for late rollover notices ^[1]. While the truce extension temporarily pauses specific tariff and non-tariff measures, it does not resolve underlying disputes or eliminate existing Section 301 and Section 232 duties ^[2].

China's potential rare earth export controls are a key flashpoint. The reimposition of significant export controls on rare earths could be aimed at extracting concessions from the US ^[5]. Prior to the September 2026 summit, the US assessed that China was meeting only two-thirds of its rare earth commitments ^[5]. The concurrent suspensions of Chinese export controls on rare earths and dual-use goods are designed to preserve leverage for both governments in ongoing negotiations ^[2].

US tariff policy could also shift before the truce ends. The determination of Section 301 excess-capacity tariffs was deliberately postponed until after the US midterm elections in November 2026, with final implementation expected post-midterms, allowing political outcomes to influence tariff policy ^[2]^[3]. In July 2026, the Chinese government claimed that the Trump administration had agreed to cap any new US tariffs on China, including the 12.5 percent forced labor Section 301 action, at or below 20 percent ^[6]. Separately, in February 2026, the Trump Administration imposed a 12.5% levy on numerous Chinese products, adding to earlier Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs, following a Supreme Court ruling against emergency tariffs ^[4].

Sources (6)

7. What is the calculated impact of the scheduled January 1, 2027 Section 232 tariff hikes on the overall effective US tariff rate for Chinese imports?

Upholstered Furniture Tariff Increase	From 25% to 30% on January 1, 2027 ^[1]^[2]^[3]^[4]
Kitchen Cabinets/Vanities Tariff Increase	From 25% to 50% on January 1, 2027 ^[2]^[3]^[4]
Kalshi Market Odds (Jan 1, 2027)	98% for '20% or above' ^[5]^[6]

Specific Section 232 tariffs are scheduled to increase for certain Chinese imports in 2027. On January 1, 2027, Section 232 tariffs on upholstered wooden furniture, including couches, sofas, and chairs, will increase from 25% to 30% ^[1]^[2]^[3]^[4]. Concurrently, tariffs on kitchen cabinets and vanities are set to rise from 25% to 50% ^[2]^[3]^[4]. These scheduled increases were previously delayed by one year from an initial January 1, 2026, implementation ^[2]^[3]^[4].

These specific tariff changes do not directly impact the overall effective tariff rate. These product-level Section 232 tariff increases do not directly translate to the overall effective US tariff rate for Chinese imports, as defined by the Kalshi prediction market ^[6]^[7]^[8]^[9]. The prediction market's resolution criteria for the general import tariff rate explicitly exclude product-specific duties or exemptions ^[6]^[7]^[8]^[9]. For example, Chinese-origin kitchen cabinets and vanities already face substantial additional antidumping duties up to 262.18% and countervailing duties up to 293.45%, which have largely eliminated them from the US market since April 2020 ^[2]. Other factors influencing Chinese imports include the expiration of the IEEPA-based 20% reciprocal tariff on February 24, 2026, and Section 122 on July 24, 2026 ^[10]. Furthermore, Section 301 tariffs on various Chinese goods are currently either 7.5% or 25%, with product exclusions on 178 items extended until November 10, 2026 ^[11].

Kalshi forecasts high probability for significant overall tariff rates. As of November 6, 2026, the Kalshi market forecasts for the overall tariff rate on Chinese imports on January 1, 2027, indicate a 98% probability for '20% or above', a 78% probability for '30% or above', and a 66% probability for '50% or above' ^[5]^[6].

Sources (11)

8. How do the Trump administration's stated tariff objectives for 2027 contrast with the legislative priorities of the new Democratic majority in Congress?

Trump Admin 2027 Tariff Objectives	Promote domestic manufacturing, national security, substitute for federal income taxes ^[1]
2027 Section 232 Tariffs (effective Jan 1)	Upholstered furniture to 30%, kitchen cabinets to 50% ^[2]
Democratic Midterm Election Outcome	Majorities in House and Senate (November 3, 2026) ^[3]

The Trump administration aims to expand tariffs for economic and security goals by 2027, intending to promote domestic manufacturing, safeguard national security, and utilize tariffs as a substitute for federal income taxes, based on the belief that trade deficits are inherently detrimental ^[1]. Following a February 2026 Supreme Court ruling, the administration has been reconstituting its tariff framework through expanded use of Sections 301 and 232, launching investigations into areas such as manufacturing overcapacity and forced-labor enforcement ^[4]. Specific tariff increases are scheduled to become effective on January 1, 2027, with Section 232 tariffs on upholstered furniture increasing to 30% and on kitchen cabinets to 50%, alongside various capped rates for wood products from certain countries ^[2].

Democrats gained congressional control, vowing to dismantle existing tariffs, having secured majorities in both the House and Senate during the November 3, 2026 midterms ^[3]. This electoral outcome prompted House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries to emphasize the necessity of 'eradicating the Trump tariffs' ^[5]. Consequently, the Democratic-controlled Congress is anticipated to pursue legislation aimed at dismantling these tariffs and alleviating inflationary pressures on consumers and businesses ^[6].

Despite Democratic aims, significant tariff policy reversal faces challenges. Credendo suggests that a substantial reversal of US trade policy is improbable, citing a growing bipartisan consensus on a tough trade approach, particularly concerning China, as demonstrated by the Biden administration retaining most tariffs on Chinese imports from the previous Trump term ^[7]. Furthermore, the upcoming 2027 debt-ceiling negotiations could offer an opportunity for Democrats to seek tariff-related concessions ^[3].

Sources (7)

9. Which official data sources will determine the final effective tariff rate on Chinese imports for the January 1, 2027 resolution?

Resolution Date	January 1, 2027 ^[1]^[2]
Official Data Sources	Executive Orders (EOs) ^[1]^[3]^[2]
Example 2026 Tariff Rate	20% (10% Reciprocal Tariff EO 14358 + 10% Fentanyl Duty EO 14357) ^[1]^[3]^[2]

Executive Orders (EOs) serve as the authoritative legal instruments determining the final effective tariff rate on Chinese imports for the January 1, 2027 resolution ^[1]^[3]^[2]. These EOs establish the specific tariff rates, with notable examples including EO 14358 (imposing a 10% Reciprocal Tariff on China), EO 14357 (imposing a 10% Fentanyl Duty on China), and EO 14326 (providing a Reciprocal Tariff framework) ^[1]^[3]^[2]. The resolution specifically references the general import tariff rate actively in effect and being collected on January 1, 2027, encompassing both universal tariffs applied to all U.S. imports and country-specific tariffs targeting China ^[1]^[3]^[2].

Only actively collected, general baseline tariffs contribute to the final rate. For resolution purposes, only tariffs that are currently active and being collected are considered valid; tariffs that have been announced but not yet implemented, paused, or suspended do not qualify ^[1]^[3]^[2]. The applicable tariff rate refers specifically to the general baseline rate, excluding any product-specific duties or exemptions. In instances where multiple general rates apply, the overall import tariff rate is calculated as the sum of all effective general rates. For instance, on January 1, 2026, the general import tariff rate on Chinese imports totaled 20%, which comprised a 10% Reciprocal Tariff (EO 14358) and a 10% Fentanyl Duty (EO 14357) ^[1]^[3]^[2].

Sources (3)

10. What public statements or economic data from Beijing support or contradict Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's May 2026 assessment of China's tariff tolerance?

Beijing's Policy Stance	Emphasized 'uncertainties and unforeseen factors' justifying flexible foreign policy ^[1]
Economic Resilience Assessment	China's economy shows 'constrained resilience' limiting shock absorption ^[2]
G20 Trade Barrier Stance	China resisted coordinated trade barriers at G20, preventing joint statement ^[3]^[4]

Beijing's public statements and economic data suggest a limited tolerance for new tariffs. The Fourth Party Plenum Communiqué acknowledged 'uncertainties and unforeseen factors,' which has prompted a flexible foreign-policy approach and tactical accommodations, such as temporary truces and partial quota restorations, to satisfy domestic and international business interests ^[1]. An assessment of China's economy reveals 'constrained resilience,' noting that weaknesses in the property market, consumption dips, youth unemployment, financial sector pressure, and low household confidence restrict Beijing's capacity to withstand external shocks ^[2]. This limited tolerance was further evidenced when G20 economic officials could not reach a joint statement due to China's opposition to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's proposal for coordinated trade barriers ^[3]^[4]. By November 2026, the United States was pressing China to honor commitments as rare earth shipments fell short following the Busan trade truce ^[5].

Conversely, China holds significant structural leverage in several key industrial sectors. These areas include rare-earth processing, permanent magnets, batteries, solar technology, electric vehicles, clean-technology components, and overall industrial manufacturing ^[2]. This inherent strength in critical industries suggests a potential resilience in specific sectors, possibly enabling China to absorb certain external pressures despite broader economic constraints.

Sources (5)

11. What Could Change the Odds

Key Catalysts

Kalshi assesses the probability of a 30% or above tariff rate on Chinese imports on January 1, 2027, at 78%, a 50% or above rate at 66%, and a 100% or above rate at 6%. The 20% or above contract is priced at 98% ^[1]^[2]. Separately, the Manifold market indicates the most probable tariff band on January 1, 2027, is (10, 25]% at 27%, followed by (25, 50]% at 20%, and <=10% at 30%. Bands for (75, 100]%, (100, 150]%, and >150% are 12%, 7%, and 4% respectively ^[3].

The US Supreme Court ruled on February 20, 2026, that IEEPA-based tariffs were unconstitutional ^[4]. All IEEPA tariffs terminated effective February 24, 2026, and were replaced by a 10% Section 122 global tariff effective the same date, with a 150-day statutory limit expiring around July 24, 2026 ^[4]^[5]^[6]^[7]. The US weighted average tariff rate declined to 13% from 17% following this ruling and Section 122 implementation ^[8]. The administration was working toward finalizing an increase to 15% for the Section 122 tariff ^[8]. The US-China trade truce, originally agreed in November 2025, was extended to January 10, 2027 ^[9]^[10]^[11]^[12]. This truce reduced the fentanyl-related tariff on China from 20% to 10% and paused the 34% country-specific reciprocal rate, though the 10% minimum reciprocal rate still applies ^[9]^[10]^[11]^[12]. Section 301 exclusions and port-fee suspensions also run through this period ^[9]^[10]^[11]^[12].

The Political Group (TPG) puts the chance the truce is extended past January 10, 2027, or replaced by a broader deal, at 81% as of October 12, 2026 ^[13]. A lapse would bring back suspended port fees and rare earth controls and invite new tariffs ^[13]. Strature's KQ-25 estimates a 10% probability that a US tariff increase on all or substantially all Chinese goods above the rate in force on October 2, 2026, takes effect by January 10, 2027 ^[14]. KQ-33 estimates a 40% probability of a general US tariff rise on Chinese goods between January 11, 2027, and September 30, 2029 ^[15]. As of August 2026, the US was reportedly considering a 7.5% additional tariff on Chinese goods related to excess manufacturing capacity, which would raise total duties on Chinese goods to about 20% ^[16]. Key diplomatic catalysts include the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen (November 17-20, 2026), where Trump is expected to meet Xi Jinping, and the G20 in Miami, with the truce expected to be rolled forward near its January end date ^[17]^[18]. The Section 301 forced-labor duty (10% or 12.5% on 60 countries, effective July 24, 2026) sits outside the truce ^[7]^[17].

Key Dates & Catalysts

Expiration: January 08, 2027
Closes: January 01, 2027

Sources (18)

12. Keep Exploring

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13. Related News

+87.0pp Published: November 8, 2026

Last updated: November 8, 2026, 12:14 UTC

USTR's Short-Term China Truce Extension Locks In High Tariff Bets

A brief, two-month extension of a U.S.-China trade truce announced by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has triggered a significant repricing in prediction markets, cementing expectat...

What will the tariff rate on Chinese imports be on Jan 1, 2027?

Short Answer

1. Market Behavior & Drivers

Who Wins and Why

Current Context

2. Price Chart

Historical Price (Probability)

3. Significant Price Movements

Outcome: 20% or above

📈 November 08, 2026: 87.0pp spike

📉 November 06, 2026: 88.0pp drop

📈 October 30, 2026: 25.0pp spike

Outcome: 50% or above

📈 November 05, 2026: 43.0pp spike

📉 October 29, 2026: 54.0pp drop

4. Market Data

Contract Snapshot

Available Contracts

Market options and current pricing

Market Discussion

5. Trust Index

6. What potential diplomatic or economic events could cause the US-China trade truce to be altered before its January 10, 2027 expiration?

7. What is the calculated impact of the scheduled January 1, 2027 Section 232 tariff hikes on the overall effective US tariff rate for Chinese imports?

8. How do the Trump administration's stated tariff objectives for 2027 contrast with the legislative priorities of the new Democratic majority in Congress?

9. Which official data sources will determine the final effective tariff rate on Chinese imports for the January 1, 2027 resolution?

10. What public statements or economic data from Beijing support or contradict Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's May 2026 assessment of China's tariff tolerance?

11. What Could Change the Odds

Key Catalysts

Key Dates & Catalysts

13. Related News

USTR's Short-Term China Truce Extension Locks In High Tariff Bets

Prediction Markets

Public Markets

Developers

Company

Short Answer

Who Wins and Why

Current Context

Historical Price (Probability)

Outcome: 20% or above

📈 November 08, 2026: 87.0pp spike

📉 November 06, 2026: 88.0pp drop

📈 October 30, 2026: 25.0pp spike

Outcome: 50% or above

📈 November 05, 2026: 43.0pp spike

📉 October 29, 2026: 54.0pp drop

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Market options and current pricing

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Key Catalysts

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