Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election
Short Answer
The model assigns meaningfully higher odds to Umaro Sissoco Embaló (45.1%) than the market (25.1%). However, the 2025 Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election was annulled, making any candidate's victory impossible.
1. Executive Verdict
- Umaro Sissoco Embaló cannot win; he was overthrown by a military coup.
- Fernando Dias da Costa cannot win; he was arrested after the coup.
- All candidates cannot win; the 2025 election was annulled following a coup.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome | — | — | Insufficient data |
Current Context
Guinea-Bissau navigates a post-coup transition towards scheduled 2026 elections. Presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for December 6, 2026 [^][^][^][^]. This follows a military coup on November 26, 2025, which overthrew President Umaro Sissoco Embaló [^][^][^][^]. A constitutional referendum is also set for August 30, 2026, aimed at shifting the country to a presidential system [^][^][^]. This system would grant the president increased power, including the ability to appoint the prime minister and dissolve parliament [^].
Domestic political tensions complicate the transition amid regional mediation. The continued detention of opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira strains the political atmosphere [^]. His imprisonment has drawn international condemnation and led to a diplomatic freeze in relations with Cape Verde [^][^]. Senegal, operating under the ECOWAS mandate, leads a diplomatic mediation mission to ensure a transition to constitutional governance [^][^]. The upcoming referendum and the December elections are critical milestones in this process [^][^]. Guinea-Bissau electoral law prohibits the publishing of public opinion polls, making prediction market or polling data unavailable [^].
Discrepancies exist regarding official presidential election date confirmations. As of August 18, 2026, expert-curated sources from Ballotpedia contain no documented developments or specific election dates concerning a 2026 presidential election in Guinea-Bissau [^].
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
This market displays a sideways price channel with an implied probability that has ranged from 1.1% to 16.3%. The contract opened at 16.2% and currently sits at 14.4%. The most significant feature of this market is the complete absence of trading activity. With zero contracts traded across 336 data points, the price fluctuations are not driven by participant sentiment or new capital. Instead, the price movement is likely an artifact of an automated market maker's pricing curve or algorithmic adjustments in an illiquid environment.
The market's low valuation reflects a fundamental disconnect with reported events. The contract resolves based on Umaro Sissoco Embaló winning a 2025 presidential election. However, context indicates Embaló was overthrown in a military coup in November 2025. Subsequent general elections are now reportedly scheduled for December 2026. This makes the premise of the market contract—a 2025 victory for Embaló—a highly improbable scenario. The lack of volume suggests traders have not found the contract's terms to be a viable vehicle for expressing a view on Guinea-Bissau's political future.
3. Significant Price Movements
Notable price changes detected in the chart, along with research into what caused each movement.
📉 August 14, 2026: 8.8pp drop
Price decreased from 22.5% to 13.8%
Outcome: Fernando Dias da Costa
What happened: The research indicates that the described market movement for a "Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election" on August 14, 2026, with Fernando Dias da Costa as an outcome and an 8.8 percentage point drop, cannot be attributed to any discernible cause. There is no evidence of a presidential election occurring in Guinea-Bissau involving Fernando Dias da Costa on that date, nor any record of an 8.8 percentage point drop associated with such an event [^][^]. Instead, on August 14, 2026, Guinea-Bissau launched a national campaign for a constitutional referendum, which is scheduled for August 30, 2026, and may influence future presidential elections [^][^]. Given the absence of the stated market event, social media activity was irrelevant to the specified price movement.
📈 August 13, 2026: 12.1pp spike
Price increased from 10.5% to 22.6%
Outcome: Fernando Dias da Costa
What happened: The stated 12.1 percentage point spike in the prediction market for Fernando Dias da Costa on August 13, 2026, appears to be based on misattributed data. This specific metric is consistently associated with unrelated events, such as UK 2024 parliamentary election swings or 2026 Tamil Nadu election data, rather than Guinea-Bissau politics [^]. Furthermore, a similar percentage increase was documented in 2017 school board elections, suggesting a potential misattribution to this query [^]. Consequently, identifying a primary driver for a price movement that seemingly did not occur in this specific market context is not possible, rendering social media as irrelevant.
4. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
For a specific listed candidate, a "YES" resolution is triggered if they win the Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election, which includes any potential second round; otherwise, it's a "NO" resolution. The first round of the election is scheduled for November 23, 2025, with a potential second round on November 30, 2025. If the election's winner is not known by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET, the market will resolve to "Other," with final resolution based on credible reporting, prioritizing official results from Guinea-Bissau's National Election Commission (CNE) if there is ambiguity.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|
Market Discussion
Here's a summary of the market discussion for the Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election:
1. Main viewpoints being discussed by traders: The market generally identifies Fernando Dias da Costa and Umaro Sissoco Embaló as the primary contenders, with Fernando Dias da Costa currently holding a narrow lead in trader pricing over Embaló. The vast majority of other candidates are considered longshots, trailing far behind. One individual trader, however, expresses a strong conviction that Mamadu Iaia Djaló is the "clear front runner" and should be priced at 80%, significantly contrasting with the current market odds. 2. Key arguments for YES vs NO: The discussion does not contain explicit arguments for or against specific candidates. Instead, the market's probabilities are influenced by the complex political landscape, including party negotiations, potential alliances or withdrawals among candidates, and the fragmented nature of the opposition. The absence of opinion polls means that trader positioning is driven by these evolving political dynamics. 3. Any notable insights or consensus: The market largely converges on Fernando Dias da Costa and Umaro Sissoco Embaló as the most likely winners. A key insight is that future shifts in probabilities are anticipated to stem from major endorsements, legal rulings concerning candidacies, or security developments in the coming months, rather than traditional polling data.
5. Trader Dashboard
A deterministic, per-market integrity scorecard computed from order-book and price data. Higher is better for Trader Trust, Liquidity, Move Quality and Resolution; higher means more risk for Quote Risk and Avoid Risk.
Umaro Sissoco EmbalóPrimaryTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Mamadu Iaia DjalóTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Honório Augusto LopesTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
João Bernardo VieiraTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
João de Deus MendesTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Fernando Dias da CostaTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Mário da Silva JúniorTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Herculano Armando BequinsaTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Siga BatistaTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
José Mário VazTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Baciro DjáTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Gabriel Fernando IndiTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate ATrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate BTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate CTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate DTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate ETrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate FTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate GTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate HTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate ITrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate JTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate KTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate LTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate MTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate NTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate OTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate PTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate QTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate RTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate STrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate TTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate UTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate VTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate WTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate XTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate YTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Candidate ZTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
OtherTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
trader_dashboard_lean_v1.13 · computed Aug 18, 2026
6. How might the outcome of the August 2026 constitutional referendum impact the campaign strategies of leading candidates like Umaro Sissoco Embaló and Domingos Simões Pereira?
| Referendum verification status | No verified information as of August 18, 2026 [^] |
|---|---|
| Proposed referendum date | August 30, 2026 [^][^][^][^] |
| Embaló election status | Cleared for December 6, 2026, presidential elections [^][^] |
Guinea-Bissau faces uncertainty regarding a potential August 2026 constitutional referendum. While there is no verified information or evidence of a scheduled constitutional referendum as of August 18, 2026 [^], reports indicate a referendum may occur on August 30, 2026. This proposed referendum aims to transition to a strongly presidential system, granting the president the power to appoint the prime minister and dissolve parliament [^][^][^][^].
A successful referendum would significantly boost Umaro Sissoco Embaló's campaign strategy. If these constitutional changes pass, establishing a strongly presidential system, Embaló would benefit from expanded presidential powers [^][^][^][^]. He has already been cleared by the ruling military junta to contest the December 6, 2026, presidential elections [^][^]. The opposition views these proposed changes as an attempt to consolidate presidential power and restrict democratic processes, specifically designed to favor Embaló's return to office [^].
Conversely, Domingos Simões Pereira would confront increased strategic obstacles if changes pass. As a leading opposition figure, Pereira is currently facing legal challenges from transitional military authorities, and his party and coalition have reportedly been sidelined and disqualified from electoral processes [^][^][^]. The opposition's concerns that the constitutional changes aim to restrict democratic processes and favor Embaló [^] suggest that such changes would further disadvantage Pereira's campaign efforts. The overall impact remains conditional on the referendum actually taking place, given the ongoing lack of verified scheduling information [^].
7. What is the current legal status of detained opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira and what are the primary obstacles to his participation in the 2026 election?
| Current Location | Lisbon, Portugal (as of August 18, 2026) [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Political Activity Status | Barred from political-party activities while in Portugal [^] |
| Legal Status | Faces charges related to 2023 and 2025 coup attempts and economic crimes [^][^][^] |
Domingos Simões Pereira currently faces significant legal challenges and political restrictions. As of August 18, 2026, he is in Lisbon, Portugal, receiving medical treatment under authorization from the Guinea-Bissau Regional Military Court [^][^]. A key condition of his release and travel is a prohibition from engaging in any political-party activities while in Portugal [^]. In Guinea-Bissau, Pereira is subject to ongoing accusations of involvement in and financing alleged coup attempts in 2023 and 2025, in addition to economic crime charges that have previously led to his house arrest and imprisonment [^][^][^].
Judicial and administrative hurdles impede Pereira's 2026 election participation. His political coalition was previously barred from elections due to a late filing, and the Supreme Court disqualified his candidacy in 2025 [^][^][^]. These persistent judicial and administrative exclusions, combined with the active legal challenges and the potential for future imprisonment, form substantial barriers to his electoral prospects [^][^][^]. Furthermore, the current restriction on his engagement in political activities while abroad compounds these obstacles [^].
8. How do the foreign policy platforms and key international alliances of Umaro Sissoco Embaló and Domingos Simões Pereira differ, particularly regarding ECOWAS and Cape Verde?
| Embaló's ECOWAS Chairmanship | 2022 to 2023 [^] |
|---|---|
| Pereira's CPLP Secretary-General Term | 2008 to 2012 [^] |
| Bissau-Guinean-Cape Verde Diplomatic Status | 'Practical freezing' of ties [^] |
Umaro Sissoco Embaló's foreign policy involves a complex relationship with ECOWAS. He served as the organization's chairman from 2022 to 2023, during which he led various regional mediation efforts, including missions to the Sahel and peace initiatives concerning Russia and Ukraine [^]. This period also saw escalating tensions between the Bissau-Guinean government under Embaló and Cape Verde, leading to a 'practical freezing' of diplomatic ties. This occurred after Cape Verdean appeals for the release of Domingos Simões Pereira, whom Bissau-Guinean authorities accused of involvement in coup attempts [^].
Domingos Simões Pereira prefers a Western-oriented, cosmopolitan leadership style. He has historical ties to international Portuguese-speaking organizations, having served as Secretary-General of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) from 2008 to 2012 [^]. In the current political landscape, while Embaló sought re-election in the 2025 presidential cycle, Pereira was administratively disqualified from the ballot [^][^][^].
9. Given the legal prohibition on public opinion polls in Guinea-Bissau, what alternative data sources or qualitative indicators are available to assess voter sentiment for the 2026 election?
| Public Opinion Polls | Strictly prohibited by Article 33 of Electoral Law [^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Primary Sentiment Assessment | Crowd-reading at campaign rallies [^] |
| Other Qualitative Signals | Civil society reports, public protests, discourse analysis [^][^][^] |
Article 33 of Guinea-Bissau's Electoral Law prohibits public opinion polls, necessitating alternative sentiment assessment. This legal restriction on disseminating poll results compels researchers to rely entirely on alternative data sources and qualitative indicators to gauge voter sentiment and the public mood in anticipation of the 2026 election [^][^][^].
Various qualitative indicators offer insights into public opinion. Key alternative methods include crowd-reading, which assesses public sentiment by observing the intensity and themes of campaign rallies [^]. Additional qualitative indicators involve monitoring reports from civil society organizations, tracking public protests, and analyzing public discourse on issues such as institutional trust, economic dissatisfaction, and the desire for change [^][^][^]. While international and domestic observer missions play a crucial role in documenting electoral legitimacy, their focus remains on evaluating the electoral environment rather than predicting vote shares [^][^][^]. Prediction markets and post-election qualitative analyses are also utilized for retrospective or speculative framing of voter sentiment in the absence of traditional polling data [^][^].
10. What specific actions from the ECOWAS mediation mission, led by Senegal, could serve as catalysts to alter the election timeline or candidate eligibility before December 2026?
| Lead Mediator Appointed | Senegal in July 2026 [^] |
|---|---|
| Elections Scheduled | December 6, 2026 [^] |
| Constitutional Referendum Planned | August 30, 2026 [^] |
ECOWAS, led by Senegal, seeks to restore constitutional order. The ECOWAS mediation mission, under Senegal's leadership, is engaged in influencing Guinea-Bissau's political transition following a November 2025 coup and subsequent military-led transitional governance [^][^][^]. Senegal was formally appointed as the lead mediator in July 2026, receiving its mandate in August 2026 [^][^][^]. The primary objective of ECOWAS is to advocate for a more inclusive transition and the restoration of constitutional order within the nation [^][^][^].
ECOWAS pressures transitional authorities to adjust election processes. ECOWAS is actively pressuring the transitional authorities to potentially alter the election timeline or candidate eligibility ahead of the presidential and legislative elections, which are officially scheduled for December 6, 2026 [^][^][^]. Specific demands from ECOWAS include the release of political detainees and ensuring broad participation in the political process, moving beyond the current electoral framework [^][^][^]. Potential actions to facilitate these changes involve leveraging mediation to modify the constitutional referendum, slated for August 30, 2026, or compelling the junta to relax candidate eligibility criteria, which could allow previously excluded opposition figures, such as those from the PAIGC, to participate [^][^][^].
11. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
On November 23, 2025, Guinea-Bissau held presidential and legislative elections that were later annulled following a military coup on November 26, 2025 [^] [^] [^] [^] . Although presidential elections were part of this reported event, no evidence of a presidential election occurring on November 23, 2025, exists in expert-curated databases such as the AP Elections repository [^][^][^]. The military junta, led by Major-General Horta Inta-a, seized election materials, destroyed servers, and arrested opposition figures including Fernando Dias da Costa and Domingos Simões Pereira [^][^][^]. Major-General Horta Inta-a was sworn in as transitional president on November 27, 2025 [^][^][^].
New elections have been scheduled for December 2026, following the coup and the failed 2025 election [^] . As of June 2026, opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira remains under house arrest, raising international concerns regarding the credibility of future electoral processes [^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Closes: November 23, 2025
12. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: On November 23, 2025, Guinea-Bissau held presidential and legislative elections that were later annulled following a military coup on November 26, 2025 [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Although presidential elections were part of this reported event, no evidence of a presidential election occurring on November 23, 2025, exists in expert-curated databases such as the AP Elections repository [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: The military junta, led by Major-General Horta Inta-a, seized election materials, destroyed servers, and arrested opposition figures including Fernando Dias da Costa and Domingos Simões Pereira [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Major-General Horta Inta-a was sworn in as transitional president on November 27, 2025 [^] [^] [^] .
14. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
