Argentina Presidential Election Winner
Short Answer
Both the model and the market expect Javier Milei to win the Argentina Presidential Election, with no compelling evidence of mispricing.
1. Executive Verdict
- Javier Milei leads; his political capital ties to economic transformation and legislative reforms.
- Axel Kicillof leads the Peronist challenge, organizing opposition against President Milei.
- Milei's public support appears competitive; 2023 polling firms often overestimated his performance.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Javier Milei | 52.0% | 52.5% | Outcome reflects current market participant expectations. |
| Axel Kicillof | 41.0% | 44.0% | Outcome reflects current market participant expectations. |
| Sergio Massa | 5.5% | 0.0% | Outcome reflects current market participant expectations. |
| Mauricio Macri | 0.6% | 0.0% | Outcome reflects current market participant expectations. |
| Myriam Bregman | 1.8% | 0.0% | Outcome reflects current market participant expectations. |
Current Context
President Javier Milei, who won the Argentine presidential election in November 2023, has officially confirmed his intent to run for reelection in the 2027 general elections [^] [^] . His current term concludes on December 10, 2027 [^][^]. The next Argentine general election is scheduled for October 24, 2027, with a potential runoff on November 21, 2027 [^][^].
Milei's administration confronts legislative hurdles and internal political tensions. As of August 2026, the Milei administration focuses on a complex legislative agenda, including proposed reforms to the Central Bank (BCRA) charter and the potential elimination of PASO primary elections [^][^][^]. Managing opposition and internal coalition tensions remains a challenge for the government [^][^][^]. Recent political developments include Milei's efforts to strengthen his alliance with the PRO party and ongoing public debates over economic policy [^][^][^]. The 2027 budget presentation is scheduled for September 15, 2026 [^].
Public opinion surveys reflect significant disapproval for President Milei. As of August 2026, a UdeSA survey reported a 61% disapproval rating for President Milei's performance [^].
2. Market Behavior & Price Dynamics
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
This contract's price has been range-bound since inception, trading sideways within a narrow 6-point band between 50.5% and 56.5%. It began at 51.5% and currently sits at 50.5%, indicating no clear directional trend. The price movements appear to establish support at the 50.5% level and resistance at 56.5%, though these levels are not battle-tested. Market sentiment, as reflected by the price, is essentially neutral, pricing a Milei reelection as a coin-flip scenario. The current price sits just above the 50% equilibrium point.
The most critical technical factor is the complete absence of trading volume. With zero contracts traded, the price chart does not reflect a consensus formed by market participants. Instead, the price movements are likely automated adjustments by a market maker or reflect theoretical odds without any capital committed. The lack of volume means price changes, such as the move from 55.5% down to 50.5% in mid-August 2026, cannot be attributed to specific news events or shifts in trader conviction. The market is entirely illiquid, suggesting participants are unwilling to take a position this far out from the 2027 election.
3. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
This market determines the winner of the Argentinian Presidential election, including any second round, scheduled for October 24, 2027. A specific candidate's contract resolves to 'YES' if they win the election, otherwise, it resolves to 'NO'. Resolution relies on a consensus of credible reporting, prioritizing official Argentinian government sources in case of ambiguity; if a definitive winner is not known by October 31, 2028, 11:59 PM ET, the market will resolve to "Other," meaning all listed candidates' contracts resolve to 'NO'.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Javier Milei | $0.51 | $0.50 | 52% |
| Axel Kicillof | $0.42 | $0.59 | 41% |
| Sergio Massa | $0.06 | $0.96 | 6% |
| Myriam Bregman | $0.02 | $0.99 | 2% |
| Juan Grabois | $0.01 | $1.00 | 1% |
| Dante Gebel | $0.01 | $0.99 | 1% |
| Mauricio Macri | $0.00 | $1.00 | 1% |
| Victoria Villarruel | $0.01 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Juan Schiaretti | $0.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Esteban Bullrich | $0.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Facundo Manes | $0.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Other | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person A | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AA | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AB | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AC | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AD | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AE | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AF | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AG | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AH | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AI | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AJ | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AK | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AL | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AM | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AN | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AO | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AP | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AQ | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AR | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AS | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AT | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AU | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AV | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AW | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AX | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AY | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person AZ | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person B | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person C | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person D | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person E | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person F | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person G | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person H | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person I | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person J | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person K | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person L | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person M | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person N | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person O | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person P | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person Q | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person R | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person S | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person T | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person U | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person V | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person W | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person X | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person Y | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
| Person Z | $1.00 | $1.00 | 0% |
Market Discussion
The market for the 2027 Argentine Presidential Election is closely contested between Javier Milei and Axel Kicillof, reflecting a balance of influencing factors. Milei faces challenges due to sharply declining approval ratings, persistent high inflation, economic strain, and corruption concerns, despite his administration's fiscal surplus and reforms. Kicillof's support stems from strong polling and efforts to consolidate opposition. A significant 30% of voters remain undecided, indicating fragmentation, with market shifts expected to depend on economic data, Peronist coalition unity, and major legislative or scandal-driven developments.
4. Trader Dashboard
A deterministic, per-market integrity scorecard computed from order-book and price data. Higher is better for Trader Trust, Liquidity, Move Quality and Resolution; higher means more risk for Quote Risk and Avoid Risk.
Javier MileiPrimaryTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Juan GraboisTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Esteban BullrichTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Axel KicillofTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Sergio MassaTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Juan SchiarettiTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Facundo ManesTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Myriam BregmanTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Victoria VillarruelTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Mauricio MacriTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Dante GebelTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move
- Factor
Person ATrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person BTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person CTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person DTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ETrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person FTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person GTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person HTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ITrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person JTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person KTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person LTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person MTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person NTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person OTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person PTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person QTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person RTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person STrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person TTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person UTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person VTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person WTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person XTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person YTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ZTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AATrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ABTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ACTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ADTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AETrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AFTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AGTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AHTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person AITrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AJTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AKTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ALTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person AMTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ANTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AOTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person APTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AQTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ARTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ASTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person ATTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AUTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person AVTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person AWTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AXTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
Person AYTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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Person AZTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
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OtherTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—Insufficient Data
- Factor
trader_dashboard_lean_v1.13 · computed Aug 18, 2026
5. What are the primary legislative battles, such as Central Bank reform, that could define Javier Milei's political capital ahead of the 2027 election?
| Primary Legislative Focus | Central Bank reform bill (as of August 2026) [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Post-2025 Congressional Strength | Stronger, but still lacks formal majority [^][^] |
| Critical Agenda Needs | Lift currency controls and secure new IMF agreements (as of late 2026) [^][^] |
Milei's political capital hinges on economic transformation and key legislative reforms. Javier Milei's political capital leading up to the 2027 election is primarily defined by legislative efforts aimed at economic transformation [^][^][^][^]. As of August 2026, a critical legislative battle involves a Central Bank reform bill, designed to prohibit the institution from financing government spending and to embed current austerity policies into law, thereby solidifying his economic legacy [^][^]. His broader platform also includes initiatives to reduce government spending, shrink the state, and potentially dismantle the Central Bank, alongside electoral reforms such as eliminating mandatory PASO primaries and introducing a 'Ficha Limpia' law to bar individuals convicted of corruption from candidacy [^][^][^]. Furthermore, by late 2026, his political agenda critically requires lifting strict currency controls and securing new agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to manage debt repayments [^][^].
Despite increased congressional strength, Milei faces political challenges requiring alliances. Following the 2025 midterm elections, Milei's party has achieved a stronger congressional position than at the start of his term, though it still lacks a formal majority [^][^]. This parliamentary landscape necessitates negotiating ad-hoc alliances with provincial governors and center-right blocs, such as PRO, to pass significant legislation [^][^]. Milei's political standing is currently being tested by internal government infighting, allegations of corruption among senior officials, and gradually declining approval ratings [^][^]. These challenges have prompted his administration to shift its strategy from confrontation to legislative negotiation [^][^]. His ability to navigate these economic reforms without triggering severe social instability or losing public support is considered essential for his political viability leading up to the 2027 presidential election [^][^].
6. What do current approval ratings and recent provincial election outcomes suggest about Javier Milei's level of public support heading into the 2027 campaign?
| Milei Approval Ratings (Mid-2026) | 30%-40% approval, 60%-65% disapproval [^] |
|---|---|
| 2027 Presidential Prediction Market | Milei ~48.5%, Kicillof ~40.5% [^][^] |
| Voter Dissatisfaction | Nearly 30% dissatisfied with Milei and opposition [^][^] |
Javier Milei's public support heading into the 2027 campaign presents a competitive yet uncertain outlook. As of mid-2026, his approval ratings have declined to 30%-40%, with disapproval rising to 60%-65% across various polls [^]. This marks a significant drop from late 2024, when his approval stood at approximately 50%, a figure that reflected a public desire for change in Argentina [^]. Notably, this decline includes an erosion of support among younger Argentine voters, who were instrumental in his initial electoral success [^].
Milei experienced mixed provincial and midterm election results in 2025. His political trajectory included a defeat in a key Buenos Aires provincial election in September [^][^][^]. However, this was followed by a rebound and victory in the October 2025 congressional midterms, which strengthened his mandate for reforms [^][^].
The 2027 presidential election is highly competitive with increasing voter fragmentation. Looking towards the 2027 presidential race, prediction markets in mid-2026 indicate a competitive landscape. His lead over potential rivals, such as Axel Kicillof, has narrowed, with probabilities often clustered (e.g., approximately 48.5% for Milei versus 40.5% for Kicillof), signifying an environment of uncertainty and the emergence of potential 'third-way' candidates [^][^]. The political climate for 2027 is dynamic, characterized by growing voter fatigue and fragmentation, with nearly 30% of voters expressing dissatisfaction with both Milei and major opposition figures, thus opening avenues for alternative political forces [^][^].
7. How do Javier Milei's economic proposals for a second term compare with the platforms of potential Peronist challengers like Axel Kicillof or Sergio Massa?
| Public Spending Target | Maximum 25% of GDP by 2027 [^] |
|---|---|
| National Tax Reduction Goal | 90% reduction, leaving six national taxes [^][^] |
| 2027 Election Outlook | Competitive but leaning for Javier Milei (August 2026) [^][^] |
Javier Milei's second-term economic plans emphasize deep austerity and state reduction. His proposals aim to institutionalize these measures, targeting a maximum public spending limit of 25% of GDP by 2027 and a 90% reduction in national taxes, retaining only six [^][^]. These actions are designed to achieve long-term disinflation through mandatory fiscal balance and continued state downsizing. Currently, Milei's governing strategy involves extreme austerity, implementing deep cuts to health care budgets, subsidies, and public infrastructure [^][^]. These policies have led to a significant recession, falling consumer spending, and public unrest, particularly affecting retirees and the public health sector [^][^][^].
Peronist challengers offer interventionist and 'third way' economic models. Axel Kicillof advocates for a return to a more interventionist, state-supported economic framework [^][^]. In contrast, Sergio Massa is reportedly developing a 'third way' Peronist coalition, focusing on macroeconomic order, debt sustainability, and fostering industrial production [^][^].
Prediction markets show a competitive landscape for the 2027 election. As of August 2026, forecasts indicate a competitive, though currently leaning, political environment for President Javier Milei in the upcoming 2027 presidential election [^][^]. His future standing is contingent upon his mid-term performance, the nation's economic stability, and the ability of the opposition to consolidate its forces [^][^].
8. Which polling firms demonstrated the most accuracy in the 2023 Argentine general election, and what do their initial surveys for 2027 indicate?
| 2023 Election Most Accurate Pollster | AtlasIntel (anticipated Sergio Massa's first-round victory) [^] |
|---|---|
| 2023 Election Polling Performance | Most firms overestimated Javier Milei's performance, leading to broad struggles [^][^][^][^] |
| 2027 Prediction Market Favorite | Javier Milei (50-60% implied winning probability as of August 2026) [^][^][^][^] |
Polling firms largely struggled to accurately predict the 2023 Argentine general election results. Most firms overestimated Javier Milei's performance, highlighting significant challenges in polling accuracy [^][^][^][^]. AtlasIntel was the only firm identified that successfully anticipated Sergio Massa's victory in the first round [^]. This election cycle underscored a recurring pattern of inaccurate polling, leading analysts to question the reliability of various survey methodologies within Argentina's volatile political climate [^][^][^][^].
Reliable polling data for the 2027 Argentine presidential election is currently unavailable. The political landscape remains in a "wait and see" period, as analysts monitor the country's economic and political future following Javier Milei's initial term [^]. However, prediction markets as of August 2026 consistently favor the incumbent, Javier Milei, with implied winning probabilities typically ranging between 50% and 60%. Axel Kicillof is identified as the primary challenger in these markets [^][^][^][^].
9. How is the Peronist opposition organizing to challenge Milei in 2027, and what do current indicators reveal about its unity and leadership?
| Primary Peronist Challenger | Axel Kicillof [^][^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Milei Re-election Prospects | 50-55% (August 2026 prediction markets) [^][^][^] |
| Kicillof Legislative Victory Year | 2025 (in his district) [^][^] |
Axel Kicillof leads the Peronist challenge against President Milei. Axel Kicillof, the Governor of Buenos Aires Province, has emerged as the principal Peronist challenger to President Javier Milei for the 2027 presidential election, following a significant legislative victory in his district in 2025 [^][^]. As of August 2026, prediction markets indicate a competitive race, positioning Kicillof as a leading opposition alternative, while President Milei’s re-election prospects are trading near 50-55% [^][^][^].
Peronist opposition remains divided despite calls for unity. Despite calls for broader coalition building and a unified government plan, the Peronist opposition remains internally divided, experiencing ongoing friction, including tensions between Kicillof and former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner [^][^][^]. Concurrently, other centrist alternatives, such as the Provincias Unidas front, are working to build a federal base aimed at disrupting the traditional Peronist-anti-Peronist polarization [^][^][^].
10. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
Javier Milei, who won the presidential election in November 2023 [^] [^] , assumed office on December 10, 2023, for a four-year term ending December 10, 2027 [^] [^] [^] . Here's how his..." data-source-lanes="curated">[^], assumed office on December 10, 2023, for a four-year term ending December 10, 2027 [^][^][^]. Milei is eligible to run for a second consecutive term and has expressed interest in doing so [^][^]. The next Argentine general election is scheduled for October 24, 2027, with a potential runoff on November 21, 2027 [^][^][^]. However, there is no record of an official presidential election specifically scheduled for that date, with the next presidential election broadly expected in 2027 [^][^][^].
The current administration is pursuing potential electoral reforms, notably the elimination of mandatory open primary elections (PASO) [^] . These reforms would require significant congressional support and potentially constitutional amendments [^]. Midterm elections in October 2025 tested President Milei's mandate [^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Closes: October 24, 2027
11. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Javier Milei, who won the presidential election in November 2023 [^] [^] , assumed office on December 10, 2023, for a four-year term ending December 10, 2027 [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Milei is eligible to run for a second consecutive term and has expressed interest in doing so [^] [^] .
- Trigger: The next Argentine general election is scheduled for October 24, 2027, with a potential runoff on November 21, 2027 [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: However, there is no record of an official presidential election specifically scheduled for that date, with the next presidential election broadly expected in 2027 [^] [^] [^] .
13. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
