Will the Iranian regime fall before 2027?
Yes refers to: Yes
Short Answer
The Iranian regime is not expected to fall before 2027, with the market pricing this outcome at 7.0%.
1. Market Behavior & Drivers
This market is pricing a low and stable probability of Iranian regime collapse before 2027. Price fluctuations between 6.5% and 7.5% occurred in a zero-volume environment, indicating they are not reactions to news but rather minor adjustments in an inactive market. No trades have been executed, so there is no market sentiment to analyze.
The stability at a low probability aligns with reports from late August 2026. News indicates the regime is under significant, prolonged pressure from military conflict, sanctions, and internal divisions. However, these same reports confirm that the pressures have not yet been sufficient to trigger a collapse. The market's lack of activity suggests traders do not see these ongoing strains as altering the fundamental, low-probability outlook for regime change by the end of the year.
- Since last update (~28d): Our model's 'Yes' probability increased by +1.4pp, compressing the edge to 0.0 (model_led).
- The market's 'Yes' probability remained unchanged at 7.0% since the prior report.
- Our confidence score for the analysis remained stable at 5.0 (+0.0pp).
- No collapse is likely; the regime maintains robust internal security.
- No collapse, despite severe 2025/26 economic crisis and widespread protests.
Who Wins and Why
| Outcome | Market | Model | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 7.0% | 7.0% | Persistent domestic unrest and geopolitical pressures may lead to the Iranian regime's fall. |
Current Context
The Iranian regime remains in power as of September 2026, despite significant strains. A prolonged military conflict, severe economic sanctions, and deepening internal divisions continue to pressure the regime [^][^][^]. While U.S. and Israeli military pressure has damaged Iran's industrial and military capabilities, it has not yet triggered the regime's collapse or a successful popular uprising [^][^][^]. The regime has responded by tightening its security apparatus, appointing figures with intelligence backgrounds to key roles, and attempting to preempt potential unrest [^][^][^]. Following Supreme Leader Khamenei's death, an interim governing council was established, comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, and Alireza Arafi, demonstrating an effort toward institutional continuity rather than immediate collapse [^][^][^].
Organized domestic opposition capable of regime change remains absent within Iran. Exiled figures like Reza Pahlavi have actively called for protests and regime change, proposing a transition plan for a post-Islamic Republic [^][^][^][^]. However, Pahlavi lacks formal backing from the Trump administration and faces mixed domestic support, with skepticism regarding his organization's reach [^][^]. Despite widespread protests in late 2025 and January 2026, and a weakened strategic position due to military degradation and economic crisis, there is no evidence of widespread defections from the military, security forces, or political elite necessary for a regime collapse [^][^]. Congressional research sources note the absence of an organized, effective, and broadly supported Iran-based opposition movement [^][^].
The regime's near-term collapse is not guaranteed, with low probabilities forecast. Expert analysis indicates that while the regime's long-term future is increasingly precarious, its near-term collapse remains uncertain, and the transition process is highly volatile [^][^]. Quantitative projections for forced regime change in Iran (defined as removal of the IRGC and replacement with a non-autocratic government) by April 2027 estimate a low probability, generally ranging between 4% and 12% [^].
2. Price Chart
Historical Price (Probability)
Outcome probability
Date
3. Market Data
Contract Snapshot
Here is a summary of the contract rules for this prediction market:
1. What exactly triggers a YES resolution: A "Yes" resolution occurs if the Islamic Republic of Iran's current ruling regime is overthrown, collapses, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. This requires a broad consensus of credible reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g., the office of the Supreme Leader, Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or have lost de facto power over a majority of the Iranian population. A clear break in continuity, such as a new provisional government or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic, is necessary. 2. What triggers a NO resolution: A "No" resolution will occur if the conditions for a "Yes" are not met by the specified deadline. Routine political events like elections, reforms, or leadership succession, as well as internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures, do not qualify. Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel/exile groups also will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population. 3. Key dates/deadlines: The market's resolution is determined by events occurring on or before December 31, 2026, at 11:59 PM ET. This is the definitive cutoff for the Iranian regime's fall to trigger a "Yes" outcome. 4. Any special settlement conditions: The market's resolution will be determined by a broad consensus of credible reporting. This consensus must verify the dissolution, incapacitation, or replacement of the Islamic Republic's core governing structures.
Available Contracts
Market options and current pricing
| Outcome bucket | Yes (price) | No (price) | Last trade probability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | $0.07 | $0.94 | 7% |
Market Discussion
Traders overwhelmingly anticipate the Iranian regime will not fall before 2027, with the market indicating only a 7% probability of collapse. This strong consensus is attributed to the regime's proven institutional continuity, its capacity for repression in the face of major protests, and a smooth leadership succession even following external military strikes. The low likelihood of collapse stems from the perceived absence of a unified opposition, sustained elite fracturing, or nationwide mobilization capable of overcoming security forces.
4. Trader Dashboard
A deterministic, per-market integrity scorecard computed from order-book and price data. Higher is better for Trader Trust, Liquidity, Move Quality and Resolution; higher means more risk for Quote Risk and Avoid Risk.
YesTrader Trust—Liquidity—Move Quality—Resolution—Quote Risk—Avoid Risk—
Move Quality—No significant move (6h)
- Factor
- move_log_odds
- 0
trader_dashboard_lean_v1.14 · computed Sep 6, 2026
5. What specific economic or military pressure points in late 2026 could trigger mass defections within Iran's IRGC, a key precursor to regime collapse?
| Probability of Iranian regime fall before 2027 | 7-22% [^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death | February 2026 [^][^][^][^] |
| Key pressure points for IRGC defections | Collapse of internal shadow-banking economy, sustained military strain, intensified economic deprivation [^][^][^] |
Specific economic and military pressures could trigger mass defections within Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a key precursor to potential regime collapse. These pressure points include the severe strain or collapse of its internal shadow-banking economy, sustained military strain leading to logistical neglect of personnel, and intensified economic deprivation such as hyperinflation or currency collapse [^][^][^]. Such conditions could threaten the IRGC's ability to maintain its elite corporate and patronage networks, which are crucial for its internal cohesion [^][^][^].
Current assessments indicate the Iranian regime remains institutionally resilient despite recent challenges. As of September 1, 2026, prediction markets show a low probability, typically ranging from 7% to 22%, for the Iranian regime to fall before 2027, consistently viewing institutional resilience and the IRGC's economic integration as significant buffers against collapse [^][^][^][^]. Even after external military strikes and the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in February 2026, the IRGC has demonstrated strong institutional cohesion, effectively suppressing protests and managing succession without experiencing significant internal fractures [^][^][^][^]. This sustained stability has led intelligence assessments to conclude that the regime is consolidating power rather than nearing collapse [^][^][^][^].
6. What concrete evidence from 2026 demonstrates the cohesion of Iran's security apparatus and political elite, supporting the low market probability of collapse?
| Regime collapse probability | approximately 6.5% before 2027 (as of August 2026) [^][^][^][^] |
|---|---|
| Elite and security cohesion | Demonstrated in 2026 [^][^][^][^] |
| MOU expiry duration | 60 days [^][^] |
Prediction markets indicate low probability of Iranian regime collapse. As of August 2026, prediction markets estimate an approximate 6.5% chance of the Iranian regime falling before 2027 [^][^][^][^]. This reflects a consensus that, despite significant structural stress, the core institutions of the regime remain intact. This assessment is supported by concrete evidence from 2026 demonstrating the cohesion of Iran's security apparatus and political elite [^][^][^][^].
Internal stability is maintained despite challenges through unified security action. Evidence of this cohesion includes the lack of defections within the military and security sectors, the successful suppression of widespread protests in 2026, and the strategic decision by the security core—comprising the leader's office, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and intelligence services—to close ranks [^][^][^][^][^]. This strategic move was aimed at preventing power vacuums and maintaining control during high-pressure events. Despite challenges such as economic decline, international isolation, and leadership succession concerns following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death, the establishment has maintained internal order by centralizing authority within a wartime triumvirate and fostering a security-centric management style that subordinates civilian political figures [^][^][^][^].
The US adopts a harder line after a lapsed diplomatic understanding. In terms of external relations, a 60-day memorandum of understanding has expired, prompting President Trump to adopt a harder line with Iran. The United States has announced plans for an economic response following this development [^][^].
7. How does the organizational capacity of Reza Pahlavi's opposition movement compare to the Iranian regime's internal security and control mechanisms as of late 2026?
| Regime Institutional Resilience | Significant (despite severe 2025-2026 pressures) [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Regime Control Mechanisms | Tight control via digital surveillance, lethal force, and economic interests (IRGC, Basij, MOIS, FARAJA) [^] |
| Probability of Regime Fall before 2027 | Low (6.5% to 22%) (as of September 2026) [^][^] |
Information regarding the organizational capacity of Reza Pahlavi's opposition movement is not available in the research. However, the Iranian regime demonstrates significant institutional resilience as of late 2026, despite various intense pressures [^][^]. These pressures include internal power realignments following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, severe economic contraction, and ongoing military conflicts with the United States and Israel [^][^].
The regime maintains control through its robust security apparatus and extensive economic interests. The Iranian security apparatus, comprising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Law Enforcement Force (FARAJA), exerts tight control using advanced digital surveillance, lethal force, and managing widespread economic interests that incentivize the preservation of the current order [^]. Specific external pressures also include a US naval blockade on Iranian ports [^] and President Trump's announced plans for a severe economic response [^] following the launch of a war with Iran by the US and Israel [^]. As of September 2026, prediction markets indicate a low probability, generally between 6.5% and 22%, of the Iranian regime falling before 2027 [^][^].
8. What datasets are available to track the frequency and scale of domestic protests across Iran for the 2025-2026 period, and what trends do they indicate?
| Primary Protest Data Source | ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) [^][^] |
|---|---|
| Period of Increased Protest Activity | Late 2025 through early 2026 [^][^][^][^][^] |
| Regime Survival Sentiment (Sept 2026) | Overwhelmingly expected to survive [^][^][^][^][^] |
During 2025-2026, domestic protests across Iran became more frequent and geographically widespread. These demonstrations were often initiated by severe economic crises, such as currency collapse and hyperinflation, before evolving into broader anti-government dissent [^][^][^][^][^]. Key datasets tracking these events include the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which provides near-real-time data on demonstration events, political violence, and civilian targeting [^][^]. Further analysis and documentation are contributed by human rights organizations like the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) and media monitoring groups such as Iran International [^].
Despite intensified protests, the Iranian regime maintained firm control. While the intensity and scale of protest activity significantly increased from late 2025 through early 2026, the regime consistently suppressed dissent through the extensive use of lethal force, communications blackouts, and mass arrests [^][^][^][^][^]. This institutional resilience was underscored by prediction markets like Polymarket, which, in September 2026, tracked the probability of the Iranian regime falling before 2027 and indicated an overwhelming sentiment that the regime would survive despite severe domestic and external pressures [^][^][^][^][^].
9. What do recent economic indicators from 2026 reveal about the impact of prolonged sanctions and military conflict on the Iranian state's fiscal stability?
| GDP Contraction | 2.7% (2025/26 [^]) |
|---|---|
| Inflation Rate | 45–60% (2025/26 [^]) |
| Regime Survival Likelihood | >90% chance of survival through December 31, 2026 (Prediction markets, as of Sept 1, 2026 [^][^][^][^]) |
Iran's economy faced a severe crisis in 2025/26 from sanctions and conflict. During this period, the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by an estimated 2.7%, inflation soared to 45–60%, and fiscal deficits surpassed 10% of GDP [^]. These macroeconomic challenges were primarily driven by intensified international sanctions, the 2026 Israel-Iran military conflict, and significant disruptions to global energy and trade routes. The conflict inflicted substantial damage on Iranian infrastructure, including critical energy and transportation facilities. Furthermore, a U.S. naval blockade severely restricted oil exports, a vital source of government revenue, a situation exacerbated by new U.S. sanctions announced in August 2026 [^][^][^][^].
Despite these formidable pressures, the Iranian regime demonstrates unexpected resilience against collapse. Despite severe economic turmoil, ongoing internal protests, and the announcement of "crushing" new U.S. sanctions, prediction markets overwhelmingly suggest the Iranian regime will not fall before 2027 [^][^][^][^]. As of September 1, 2026, these markets consistently assign a high probability (over 90%) to the regime surviving through December 31, 2026 [^][^][^][^]. This assessment stems from the perceived absence of core structural fractures, elite defections, or a unified opposition capable of replacing the current system, underscoring the regime's resilience through its institutional strength and the cohesion of its security apparatus [^][^][^].
10. What Could Change the Odds
Key Catalysts
Prediction markets and expert analyses assign a low probability, typically 6-7%, to the Iranian regime collapsing before January 1, 2027 [^] [^] [^] [^] . — farexio" data-source-lanes="traditional">[^][^][^]. Current forecasts indicate this probability ranges from less than 8% to 9% [^][^]. Regime 'fall' is strictly defined as the dissolution or incapacitation of the Islamic Republic's core institutions, not merely internal instability or leadership succession [^][^][^]. The regime showed unexpected resilience following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death in February 2026 and subsequent military conflict [^][^][^][^][^]. The IRGC consolidated control and maintained institutional cohesion through economic entrenchment, ideological selection, and a strong internal security apparatus, engaging in tentative diplomatic efforts toward a potential 'JCPOA-Lite' settlement [^][^][^].
Despite significant internal unrest and the regime's use of violence, including thousands killed in January 2026, no organized, effective Iran-based opposition movement has coalesced [^] . and Israeli Military Operations Against" data-source-lanes="curated">[^]. Reza Pahlavi, a prominent opposition figure, faces challenges including a lack of institutional organizing power inside Iran and an absence of formal endorsement from the Trump administration [^][^][^]. His calls for nationwide protests in early 2026 were met with severe state repression, including a near-total communication blackout and internet shutdown to isolate the population [^][^]. While U.S. and Israeli strikes severely degraded Iran's military capabilities, U.S. policy emphasizes eliminating imminent threats rather than explicitly engineering a regime collapse, though officials acknowledge military pressure could create conditions favorable for such an outcome [^][^][^][^][^].
Key Dates & Catalysts
- Closes: January 01, 2027
11. Decision-Flipping Events
- Trigger: Prediction markets and expert analyses assign a low probability, typically 6-7%, to the Iranian regime collapsing before January 1, 2027 [^] [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Current forecasts indicate this probability ranges from less than 8% to 9% [^] [^] .
- Trigger: Regime 'fall' is strictly defined as the dissolution or incapacitation of the Islamic Republic's core institutions, not merely internal instability or leadership succession [^] [^] [^] .
- Trigger: The regime showed unexpected resilience following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death in February 2026 and subsequent military conflict [^] [^] [^] [^] [^] .
13. Historical Resolutions
No historical resolution data available for this series.
